Meta-Ethics

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How does meta ethics differ from normative ethics?

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1.normative decides which things are good and bad and give us a moral guide for our behaviour. kant, utilitarianism, NL are examples of normative ethics, meta ethics is ABOUT normative and tries to make sense of concepts used.

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do we recognisde good? or do we believe what is good through our subjective belief?

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this means can our ethical statements have meaning? moral realists and hold that moral facts are objective facts that are out there in the world. things are good/bad independently. this view is closely related to COGNITIVE langauge.

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cognitivist?

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according to cognitivists, moral statements describe the world. to say murder is wrong, is given it the property of wrongness. statement is objectivily ture or false

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ethical naturalism/ ethical cognitivm

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a theory that moral values can be derived from sense experience.

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ethical non-naturalism/ ethical non-cognitivism

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a theory that ethical statements CANNOT be derived from sense experience.

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non-cognitivist?

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when someone makes a moral statement they are NOT describing the world, but expressing their feelings or telling people what to do. Maroal statements ARENT descirptive and cannt be described as true or false- they are subjective.

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What are the cognivist theories in meta-ethics?

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cognitivism is the view that we can have moral knowlege. cognitivist theories about ehtical language believe that ethical statements are about facts and can be proved true or false.

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Ethical Naturalism.

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all ethical statements are the same as non-ethical (natural) ones- they're all factual and can, therefore, be verified or faslified.

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Thomas more executed for his beliefs in 1535- "thomas more was a good man"

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can be proved by looking at the evidence. that first statement is factual and can be proven (death certificate)
ethical naturalists would claim we can do the same for the second. if we can establish in his personal behaviour, he was kind, unselfish, caring or good consequences. So we can find evidence to prove or disprove the statment finding it true/false

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euthanasia

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if i want to know that euthanasia is wrong i sinply look at the evidence so that i can test the varacity of the statement. thus i could argue ends the suffering of an individual and therefore is right.

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Criticisms of ethical naturalism- Naturalistic fallcy- principa ethica (1903) G.E.morre

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argued against ethical naturalism and called an aattempt to identify goodness with a natural quality is a mistake. to claim moral statements can be verified or falsified is to commit NATURALISTIC FALLACY. basing argument on Hume.

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David Hume- to derive from an ought to an is is logically invalid. (Hums, Treatise of human nature, 1740. 2004)

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"I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. in every system of morality, which i have hitherto met with, i have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way or reasoning... when of a sudden i am surpriz'd to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, i meet with no proposition that is not conncected with an ought, or an ought not. this change is imperceptible, but is however of the last consequence

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G.E.Moores meaning.

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cant move from a descirption of how the world is to how the world "ought" to be. Moore used what bacem known as the "open question arguement". For any natural property it always make sense to ask "is it good?" and the fact that we can even ask this question shows that "good" and "bad" cannot be the names of natural properties in the way that "rough" and "smoth" are.
if we claim that happiness is a naturally good thing we couldf always ask "is happiness good?", but if happiness is naturally good then this question would make no more sense than "does happiness make people happy" However it does make snese and so we have to concluide that goodness is not a propert of happiness.

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example mother theresa helpd the dying. marting luther king jr led the civil rights movement.

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it is still right to ask "were those actions good?" there is still a possibility of people having different opinions, so moving fomr a factul objective statement to an ethical statemen of values doesnt work because it leaves an open question that has not been asnwered.

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Moore's belief

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he did believe there were moral properties and his respons eto this difficulty was to say that goodness ias a "non- natural"property which is indefinable.

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INTUITIONISM

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theory that moral truths are known by intuition

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Moore's intuition.

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Good is indefinable
there are objective moral truths
we know these moral truths by tuition.

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Intuition G.E.Moore

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good is a simple, unanalysable property, just as a primary colour is. Moore adapted a version of utilitarianism in that he said that right acts are those that produce the most good, but he siad that goodness cannot be identified with some natural property such as pleasure: goodness cannot be defined.

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Moore- Goodness cannot be defined- "principa ethica"

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If i am asked "what is good" my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. or if i am asked "how is good to be defined" my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all i have to say about it.

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Moore's Yellow example

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Moore said we cant use our senses to tell whether something is good, but we can use our "moral intuition" to say whether a statement is true or false. We recognise goodness when we see it. we just Know if something is good "simple notion"- try to define the colour yellow. cant epxlain by definition but by showign an example. so likewise we can explain what good is
"we know what "yellow" is and can recognise it whenever it is seen, but we cannot actually define yellow. in the same way we know what good is but cannot actually define it (Moore, principia ethica)

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Prichards intuitionism

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Obligations are as indefinable as good
intition decides what to do in a situation
some peoples ituition is better developed than others.

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Intuitionism H.A.Prichard.

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discussed moral claim"ought", no definition can be given to the word. like moores' yellow we can recognise its properties.- everyone recognises when we ought to do a certain action, so moral obligations are obvious. Pricharrd thought there were two types of thinknig- reason and intuition. Reason looks at the facts of a situation and intuition. Reason looks at the facts of a situation and intuition decides what to do. In any situation, Prichard thought that intuition would show whic particualr actrion was right and where our obligation lay.
He did recognise the problem that peoples morals were different, but said this was because some people had developed their moral thinking further than others. Prichard does not explain why, nor does he attempt to list any fundamental obligations or moral virtues. Where there is a conflict of obligations he simply says we must look at the situation and decide which obligation is greater. However according to Prichard ,it would seem that intuition would not be something tha

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Ross' intuitionism.

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Prima facie duties are right
judgement must be used to decide what to do in any situation
One duty can be rejected in favour of another.

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inuition W.D.Ross

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flshed out prichard and achknowledged debt to Moore and Prichard agreeing that "right" and "obligatory" are as indefinable as "good". he was a deontologist, arguing that it was obvious that certain types of actions, which he called prima facie duties were right in any particular situation we would come to recognise certain prima facie duties. Rss listed seven classes of prima facie duties:

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Prima Facie Duties.

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1. duty of fidelity (promise keeping)
2.duties of reparation- when we have done something wong.
3. duties of gratitude
4. duties of justice
5. duties of beneficence- helping others.
6. duties of self improvement.
7. duties of non-maleficence- not harming others.

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Ross and conflicting prima facie duties.

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When prima facie duties conflict, we must follow what we think is right in the situation, sometimes a prima facie duty will have to give way to another. Prima facie duties. duty at first sight.
However Ross still does not tell us how we know what a prima facie dituy actually is or how to decide which one to obey in cases of conflict.it seems that Ross would say that this depends on a persons maroal maturisty- they do not know self-evident truths and intuion has deserted them.

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Criticisms of intuitionism

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the idea of knowing what is good by intuition and not by any empircal evidence is not proved conclusively by Moore- he says you either agree with him or havent htought about it properly. However it would seem that if the naturalistic fallcy showsthat you cannot infer value judgements from natural facts by means of evidence obtaine dthrough the senses, then the inroduction of "non natural" facts and a special "intuition" simply shrouds the whole issue in mystery. Some recent philosophers such as virtue ethicists, say it is our emotions and practical wisdom that give us this intuitive knowledge.
In addiont how can we be sure that intuitions are correctm since people may come to different concluciosn, whether using intuiiong or reason to reach their decisions. As sesne experienc ecannot be used how can we desicde between our intuitions? if they contradict each other, both cannot be right, but they will be right for the person whose intuition tells him what to do. We can never know whic intuition is true or fal

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Non- cognitive theories of meta-ethics

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non-cognitivism says that there is no ethical knowledge, because ethical statement sare not statements that can be proved true or false. thus to say "euthanasia is wrong" is not a statements about facts, but some other kind of saying. Non-cognitivists make a destinction between facts and values.

Emotivism- A.J. ayer
Emotivism- C.L.Stevenson
Prescriptivism- R.M.Hare

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Emotivism- A.J.Ayer

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emotivists start from the premise there is no ethical knowledge because ethical judgements are not the kind of statements that can be true or false. Emotivism will not tell you how to live a moral life, but simply helps us understand moral statements: as action guiding and as converying certain attitudes. A.J.Ayer said "ethical terms do not serve only to express feelings. the are calculated also to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action.

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emotivism

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says that to talk about "good" and "bad" "right" and "wrong" we are sinmply expressing emotional states of approval and disapproval. Any other interpretaion of ethical statements is meaningless. Emotivism has routes in the Vienna circle, 1920s who devloped a theory "LOGICAL POSITIVISM" which holds roughly that anytruth claim must be tested by sesne experience (verification). ethical statements can only express feeling.

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A,J,Ayer language truth and logic says two types of meaningful statment.

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analytic statments- the truth or falisty of the statemnt can be determined simply by understandg the term that occur in them. examples are maths and logic
Synthetic statement) the truth of falsity of the statement can be determined by checking to establish the facts either way. exampls science, history

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ethical statements are not verifiable...

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no empiracle facts which can be check to see if any ethical statemnt is true or false- so they are meanignless. the only way the can understoof is as an expressions of feelings. Ayer's theoary of ethical language is known as "EMOTIVISM" as its an expressions of feeling of approval or disapproval, Emotivism is known as the boo/hurrah theory as in saying "murder is wrong" we are syaing "boo to murder"

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Ayer language truth and logic

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The presecne of an ethical symbol in a propsitions adds nothign to its factual content. thus if i say to someones "you acted wrongly in stelaing that money" i am not syaing anything more than if i had said "you stole that money" in adding that this acction is wrong i am not making any further statement about it. i am simpl evincing my moreal disapproval f it. it is as if i had siad "you stole that money" in aperculair tone of horror or written it with the addition of some special exclamation makrs"

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logical positivism

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the view that only those things which can be tested are meaningful

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analytic statement

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statemenets which are true by definition

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synthetic statements

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statements that can be true of falsed and can be tested using experience of senses.

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emotivism

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a theory whch says that moral statements are just expressions of feelings.

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what is emotivism

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shows how the ethical statements we make can depend on our own attitudes, upbringing and feelings, and this can lead emotivism to be criciticed as "simple subjectivism". James Rachels said that it can lead to the notion that "where mrality is concerned, there are no "factw" and no one is "right". However althout Auer does argue that ethical statements hacve no factual content he does not believe they have no meaningful function. emtocisim cannot be compared to normaitvie ethical theories and it does not give any any reason why ones persons feelings should be any better than another or why one persons feelings should stimualr a person to action rather than those of another person it simnply reduces ethical statments to the level of "i think oragne smarties are the best" and so they are simply meaningless