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62 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
- 3rd side (hint)
Basic kinds of judgements:
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Explicative & ampliative
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Explicative judgements:
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statement such that the predicate is contained (involved) in the subject (definition), analytic (Hume: relations of ideas): a priori (knowable prior to experience; eg Bachelors =df unmarried Men.
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ampliative judgements:
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predicate not contained in subject, synthetic (Hume: matter of fact): A posteriori (just known by experience)- eg “All bachelors are unhappy.”
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Where do metaphysical statements occur?
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synthetic a priori statements
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if we know something a priori we have no reason to look to experience (analytic a posteriori is useless).
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If we can only know a priori of things what we put in...
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then we can have synthetic a priori knowledge only of things as appearance.
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This is because we do not contribute anything to things as they are in themselves, since these are isolated from the subject.
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what can we know of things in themselves?
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We can't know anything a posteriori: this knowledge comes from experience, and experience comes from intuition, ie from appearances; but 2. also nothing a priori, since we put nothing in to things in themselves, so we can't get anything out.
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So we don't know anything about things in themselves (though we must posit, assume, things about things in themselves as what appearances are of).
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What kind of system is metaphysics?
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a system of synthetic a priori knowledge;
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Why do all this? To show the limits of metaphysics for speculative [=theoretical] reason. Then if we find it necessary to posit something beyond these limits for practical purposes, theoretical reason cannot refute it.
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Sciences are differentiated by (3)
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1) a difference of object, 2) a difference of source of knowledge, 3) a difference of kind of knowledge.
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2.What kind of knowledge if metaphysical knowledge?
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1.Analytic judgements are based on the law of [non] contradiction, and so all are a priori.
2. .Synthetic judgements |
without synthetic judgements there is no metaphysics. |
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How is pure mathematics possible?
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if an object (as appearance) must conform to the subject's cognitive faculties, and thus to the forms of intuitions; and these forms are space and time, as determined by geometry and arithmetic; then geometry and arithmetic are possible [and known to be applicable] a priori.
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6.Mathematics produces
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an instance (intuition) of concepts a priori, which is thus a pure intuition.
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Mathematics is intuitive in what sense?
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it needs pure intuitions to work at all. [i.e. we don't find mathematical individuals, we create or construct them.]
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A priori intuition is only of what form?
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A form under which objects appear to us, not as they are in themselves.
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Nature is ...
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the sum (connected system, not an aggregate) of appearances.
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(If nature were taken as the sum of things in themselves, we couldn't know it: not a priori (which is not possible for things in themselves [because we do not contribute anything to them], except perhaps for analytic, and hence trivial, aspects; and not a posteriori (since them natural laws would not hold necessarily, but only as derived from [contingent] experience, which could never produce necessity.
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As the sum of appearances, nature contains
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a priori laws.
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E.g. pure physics [=mechanics]; though this is partly empirical, it still contains universal and necessary principles, e.g. “substance is permanent,” “every event has a cause.”
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Nature can also be considered
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as the whole formed by the totality of all objects of experience.
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(If anything were not possibly an object of experience, it would have to be known [judged about] through concepts which are not exemplifiable in experience (hyperphysical, mystical).
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Transcendental refers to
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the conditions of experience (ways we are enabled to know an object of experience's identity)
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we take nature as...
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the conformity to law of all objects of experience.
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it is not enough to take in sense-impressions and the objects consisting of these passively, as w/ Locke & Hume, we must...
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distinguish those that are “merely subjective” (hold only for me, the subject, the individual knower; idiosyncratic) from those that are “objective” (refer to objects, holds for everyone).
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To call an appearance “objective” is to say...
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it holds for all subjects
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But then we must be able to meet the criteria of human cognition generally.
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the criteria of the identity of intuition:
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the objects as appearance must be “somewhere” and “somewhen” (have unique spatiotemporal determinations).
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We don't form judgments merely by comparing institutions [as the Empiricists thought];
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we need to be sure we can subsume these intuitions under categories to form judgements [which can be united with each other].
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We look at how judgements are formed because.
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we are trying to find out what ways (we) the human find can find unification (synthesis).
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We start with basic unification of terms in order to...
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make larger judgements
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We unify terms into a judgement...
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the same way we unify aspects of objects into objects.
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Any object we're trying to know has
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an identity as well as a unity in many respects
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properties (like color or shape) has to be unified with the substance and unified with each other
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Unification is...
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an accomplishment of the knowing substance
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(contra Locke: all ideas of qualities come into the mind individually/one at a time.)
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For Kant sensation is...
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a “blooming buzzing confusion”: there aren't any pieces that come picked out or connected, we have to pick them out or connect them.
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transcendental unity of aperception
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We think of an object as unitary because we see the properties of the object as connected together to form a whole.
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(aperception = self-consciousness).
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You cannot have...
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an isolated object (isolated from other properties, other objects, the knower).
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How do we know substance?
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we have to posit it, to assume it in order for experience to even be possible.
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Table of Judgements gives rise to
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the Table of Categories
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The table of judgements is supposed to show...
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all the possibilities of combing representations- either a singular representations (intuition) and a universal representation (concept), or two universal representations into a judgement- and also combining judgements into further more complex judgements.
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the Table of Categories:
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f the table of judgements shows all the ways representations may be combined into (simple and complex) judgements by the mind, the table of categories is a parallel table showing all the ways representations may be combined into intuitions as objects of experience.
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Every object is...
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a unity and part of a larger unity.
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What are categories?
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A priori rules for combination (synthesis).
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What do we derive from categories?
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principles which objects must meet in order to be available for combination (synthesis)
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If Nature is the connected sum of appearances...
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the principles are something we can know a priori of natural objects, and so belong to the Pure Science of Nature
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Substance is...
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permanent
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(change/alteration)
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What must one assume in order to have a quantitative account of change?
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there is something underlying what seems to be changing that does not change (like the wax example).
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Table of Principles of the Science of Nature:
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1.) Substance is permanent, 2.) Every event has a cause and 3.) All objects are in thorough-going interaction (reciprocity)
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How must causation (ordered change) be construed in order for change to be possible:
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We must assume cause and effect in order to determine time alterations. (like sufficient reason)
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we assume the order of the stages (green → yellow → brown banana; dark hair → gray hair → bald)
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You can't have substances in interaction unless
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there are other substances.
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Each action on the substance on the other is
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an action of the second one back on the first.
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If there's more than one object in the universe,
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any two objects have to have some influence on each other.
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Space, time and interaction =
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(an object part of a) systematic whole
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Substance, cause and reciprocity are...
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kinds of combination (and hook together everything we consider real).
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An object is in unity with...
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every other object and every representation is in unity with every other representation for it to be real.
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transcendental condition for the possibility of experience
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Everything is extensive magnitude, intensive magnitude, substance is permanent and everything has a cause
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Hume says: Causation is incomprehensible. What does Kant think?
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so is substances and reciprocity, as long as these are held to pertain to things in themselves. But as a condition of uniting representations, they are easily understood (even though the things in themselves remain unknown and unknowable)
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Everything we can know relates to...
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possible experience; beyond this limit, metaphysics is mere illusion and mysticism.
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Why is Nature, as the sum or appearances, 1.) materially possible and 2.) formally possible
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1.) because of the constitution of our sensibility 2.)because of the constitution of our understanding.
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How are these possible? We can't know this.
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the most universal laws of nature...
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are to be found within ourselves.
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([like Hume's “future will be like the past”] (Empirical laws require special perceptions; they are not included.)
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substance is...
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something created by me, we must do it or experience is not possible (basis for cognition/knowledge)
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We impose the spatiality and temporality of substances (contra Hume).
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The source of metaphysical knowledge is...
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not empirical; it comes before experience. It is not psychology; it must be a priori.
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(But this doesn't distinguish it from mathematics.)
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the distinction between analytic and synthetic knowledge:
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analytic explains what is in a concept, synthetic adds to it.
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Analytic judgments are based on...
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the law of [non-]contradiction, and so all are a priori.
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Synthetic judgments (i.e., those that do not come merely from the analysis of a concept):
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a. Experiential judgments (a posteriori);
b. Mathematical judgments (a priori); [see §7 below] c. Metaphysical judgments (a priori); if there are pure concepts of the understanding, they are not derived from an analysis of others. |
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Categories are...
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a priori rules of combination.
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[the Transcendental Deduction shows]:
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If the Categories exhaust the ways representations (especially singular ones, or intuitions) can be combined; and if all representations held to represent objects must be combinable with all other such representations (if they are to be thought to be real); then we can know a priori that the Categories apply to judgments of experience, and so to all objects of experience (since these must take part in judgments).
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The unity of every object results from...
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the mind's combining its constituents, and the mind also can combine every object with every other (thought real) to form a unity of the experienced world.]
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[This is the gist of the Transcendental Deduction:
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it is all derived from
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the subject's (not free) contribution (no choice but to make this contribution) to the object of knowledge, and since all these are interdependent, we can develop a system of knowledge and exhaust it: we can know all there is to know about metaphysics.
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