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14 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
St Petersburg Paradox - where expected value is infinite on a coin toss game but participants aren't willing to risk large amounts of money to play. |
N. Bernoulli (1713) |
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Solution of the St Petersburg Paradox - the more money that you have or win, the lower the utility of money. Introduces idea that decisions are based on utility rather than monetary value. |
D. Bernoulli (1738) |
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Expected utility theory - states we should make our decisions by choosing the option with the highest expected utility. |
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) |
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Demonstrated failure of invariance principle. How a gamble is framed in terms of a win or a loss can effect people's decision, even when they have the same expected value. |
Lichtenstein and Fischoff |
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Demonstrated influence of framing effects and that people seek risk avoidance when there is a gain and seek a risk when there is a loss. |
Kahneman and Tversky (1981) |
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Patients are more likely to choose a treatment which outlines the survival rate than one which expresses the same information as a mortality rate. |
McNeil et al. (1982) |
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For financial choices, people make more effort to save money if it is a high % of something small compared to a small % of something large, even if the amount is the same value. (Calculator experiment) |
Kahneman and Tversky (1981) |
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Subjective utility theory - a descriptive theory proposing that objective probability is not always available so should be substituted for subjective info. |
Savage (1954) |
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Decision analysis states the outcome with the largest sum of outcome product utilities and probabilities should be selected. |
Raiffa (1968) |
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Subjective probabilities often sum to more than 1 when alternatives are broken down |
Tversky and Koehler (1994) |
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Experts who are used to providing estimates are often accurate e.g. weather forecasters and bookies |
Murphy and Winkler (1984) |
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Experts who aren't used to providing estimates are often inaccurate e.g. doctors |
Christensen-Szalanski and Busheyhead (1981) |
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People show poor judgement and overconfidence in general knowledge but these effects do diminish in more non lab/ecologically valid settings. |
Russo and Shoemaker (1989) |
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EXPLORE MORE Meta analysis of framing effects shows differences in results depending on study designs e.g. whether information presented is qualitative or quantitative |
Kuenberger (1998) |