Evidence: Chapter 7

Front 1

Warrantless Actions that Require Probable Cause******T/F

Back 1

searches incident to arrests, searches and arrests based on exigent circumstances, including hot pursuit, and seizure of evidence based on plain view

Front 2

Chimel v. California*****T/F

Back 2

part of Warrantless Actions that Require Probable Cause; under Search Incident to Arrest; a search incident to arrest is permitted "to remove any weapons that the arrestee might seek use in order to resist arrest or effect is escape" and to "seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction"

Front 3

Timing of the Search

Back 3

under Search Incident to Arrest; probable caues to arrest must precede teh warrantless search; required that the warrantless search take place soon after probable cause to arrest; search must be contemporaneous to the arrest

Front 4

Scope of the Search

Back 4

under Search Incident to Arrest; "a warrantless search 'incident to a lawful arrest' may generally extend to the area that is consdired to be in the 'possession' or under the 'control' of the person arrested- Rabinowitz (rule of law)

Front 5

Armspan Rule*****MC

Back 5

under Scope of the Search which is under Search Incident to Arrest; a search incident to arrest is limited to the area "within the immediate control" of the person arrested-that is, "the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or someting that could have been used a evidence against him"- from Chimel, restricts rule in Rabinowitz

Front 6

Exigent Circumstances Searches (and Arrests) *****T/F

Back 6

part of Warrantless Actions that Require Probable Cause; when exigencies or emergencies of the situation require the police to act immediately at the risk of danger to themselves, danger to others, the destruction of evidence, or escape of the suspect, it would be unreasonable to require the police to take time to obtain a warrant; there are three types of exigencies recognized by the courts that authorize the olice to act without a warrant: hot pursuit, likelihood of escape or danger to others, and "evanescent" evidence

Front 7

Hot Pursuit****MC

Back 7

under Exigent Circumstances Searches (and Arrests); warrantless action based on a hot pursuit exigency is only constitutional if the police have probable cause to believe: that the person they are pursuing has committed a serious offense; that the person will be found on the premises the police seek to enter; that the suspect will escape or harm someone, or evidence will be lost or destroyed; the pursuit originates from a lawful vantage point; and the scope and timing of the search are reasonable

Front 8

Automobile Searches****T/F

Back 8

Carroll v. U.S.: "automobile exception" to the fourth amendment warrant requirement; the court declared that the warrantless search of an automobile is permissible when: there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime and securing a warrant is impractical; Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search on the grounds that the evidence would be "lost" if they had been required to take the time to secure a warrant; cars, boats, and planes are all considered automobiles; if the setting "objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for transportation," the automobile exception applies

Front 9

Three General Requirements for a Valid Warrantless Vehicle Search*****MC

Back 9

under automobile searches; the exception only applies to automobiles; with one exception, such searches must be premised on probable cause; it must be impractical to obtain a warrant

Front 10

Factors in Determining Whether a Vehicle Serves a Transportation Function****T/F

Back 10

under Automobile searches; whether it is mobile or stationary; whether it is licensed; whether it is connected to utilities; whether it has convenient acess to the road

Front 11

Plain View****T/F

Back 11

part of Warrantless Actions that Require Probable Cause; "plain view" applies in situations where evidence can be seen without having to "search" for it; plain view does not mean the same thing in criminal procedures that it does in everyday use-for police officers to conduct a valid plain view search, they must: have lawful access to the object and the object must be immediately apparent as contraband

Front 12

The "Immediately Apparent" Requirement*****MC

Back 12

under plain view; in addtion to the requirement that the police have lawful access to an object for the plain view doctrine to apply, it must also be immediately apparent that the object is subject to seizure; meants that the officer has probable cause to seize the object

Front 13

Warrantless Actions Based on Reasonable Suspicion*****T/F and MC

Back 13

Reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is affot gives police officers the authority to stop and frisk people; these investigative procedures, also known as Terry Stops, which can be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, do not require probable cause; reasonable suspicion also gives police the authority to conduct so-called stationhouse detentions from time to time

Front 14

Stop and Frisk*****T/F

Back 14

part of Warrantless Actions Based on Reasonable Suspicion; stops are separate from frisks; a stop always precedes a frisk

Front 15

The Stop

Back 15

part of Warrantless Actions Based on reasonable suspicion; under Stop and Frisk; in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court stated that "obviously not all perosnal intercourse between policemant and citizens involves seizures of person;" instead, the Fourth Amendment applies only "when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen"; a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendement only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person whoud have believed that he was not free to leave- objective standard, reasonableness test; an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer that is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop-similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time

Front 16

The Frisk*****MC

Back 16

part of Warrantless Actions Based on Reasonable Suspicion; under Stop and Frisk; the additional step of frisking a suspect is a fourth amendment intrusion that requires justification apart from that required to stop the person; in order to conduct a frisk, the officer needs reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous; this requirement is in addition to the reasonable suspicion required to stop the person for questioning; while Terry held that a frisk is permissible only when an officcer reasonably fears for his or her safety, there is still considerable dispute over the situations in which a frisk is appropriate

Front 17

Investigative Detentions*****T/F

Back 17

part of Warrantless Actions Based on Reasonable Suspicion; the Supreme Court has held that certain stationhouse detentions are justifiable on less than probable cause; stationhouse detentions are used in many locations for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints or photographs, ordering lineups, administering polygraph examinations, or securing other types of evidence; stationhouse detentions for the purpose of fingerprinting are permissible when: there is reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect has committed a crime, there is a reasonable belief that the fingerprints will inculpate or exculpate the suspect, the procedure is carried out promptly

Front 18

Inventory

Back 18

under Warrantless action based on administrative justification; taken after the fact for the purpose of developing a record of what items are now in custody; both types of inventory searches are fallbacks in teh sense that they often occur after an earlier search

Front 19

Vehicle Inventories******T/F

Back 19

part of inventory; occur under a number of situations, usually after a car has been impounded for traffic of parking violations; in South Dakota v. Opperman, the Supreme Court held that warrantless inventories are permissible on administrative/regulatory grounds; however they must be: following a lawful impoundment, of a routine nature, following standard operating procedures, and not a "pretext concealing an investigatory police motive"; inventory searches cannot be used in lieu of a "regular" search requiring probable cause

Front 20

Inspections****MC

Back 20

part of Warrantless Actions based on Administrative Justification; are permissible without a warrant or probable cause; the benefits of some inspections outweigh the costs of inconveniencing certain segments of the population- balancing test; Camara v. Municipal Court- concluded that "there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails"

Front 21

Checkpoints

Back 21

part of warrantless actions based on administrative justification; whereas inspections target a particular home or business, checkpoints have an element of randomness

Front 22

Border and Illegal Immigrant Checkpoints*****T/F and MC

Back 22

under Checkpoints; the interest of "national self protection" to permit government officials to require "one entering the country to identify himselp as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in; the court has reaffirmed the need for warrantless border inspections: "routing searches of the persons and effects of entrants at the border are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant (U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez)

Front 23

Drunk Driving Checkpoints****T/F

Back 23

under Checkpoints; Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz- the court upheld warrantless, suspicionless checkpoints designed to detect evidence of drunk driving

Front 24

Other Types of Checkpoints ****T/F

Back 24

under Checkpoints; Delaware v. Prouse- Supreme Court held that law enforcement officials cannot randomly stop drivers for the purpose of checking their drivers' licenses; airpot checkpoints are also authorized- there is no need for probable cause or reasonable suspicion in such situations

Front 25

School Disciplinary Searches*******MC

Back 25

part of warrantless actions based on administrative justification; public school administrators and teaches may search students without a warrant if they possess reasonable suspicion that the search will yield evidence that the student has violated the law or is violating the law or rules of the school; however, such school disciplinary searches must not "be excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the students and the nature of the infraction"- New Jersey v. T.L.O.- Supreme Court held that the evidence was admissible because the administrator had sufficient justification to search the purse for evidence concerning the school's antismoking policy; in T.L.O., the court noted that a warrant requirement "would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools"; note that T.L.O. concerns students in grades K-12- the courts have generally held that the fourth amendment is applicable at the university level

Front 26

Drug and Alcohol Testing*****T/F

Back 26

part of warrantless actions based on administrative justification; the Supreme Court has permitted warrantless, suspicionless drug and alcohol testing of employees; the court cited two reasons for this decision: the first was deterrence-without suspicionless drug testing, there would be no deterrent to employees to stay off of drugs and the second reason was that drug testing promotes businesses' interest in obtaining accurate information about accidnents and who is responsible

Front 27

Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton(1995)

Back 27

part of Drug and Alcohol testing; extended drug testing decisions to include public school students; court upheld a random drug testing program for school athletes; the court noted that athletes enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy given the semi-public nature of locker rooms where the testing took place; also, athletes are often subject to other intrusions, including physical exams, so drug testing involved "negligible" privacy intrusions according the courts

Front 28

Vernonia School with Board of Education v. Earls (2002)*****MC

Back 28

part of drug and alcohol testing; The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy implemented by the Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County required students who participate in extracurricular activities to submit to random suspicionless drug tests; Supreme Court held that random, supspicionless drug testing of students who participate in extracurricular activities "is a reasonable means of furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren and does not violate the fourth amendment

Front 29

Probation Supervision Searches******T/F and MC

Back 29

part of warrantless actions based on administrative justification; people on probation enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy than the typical citizen; Griffin v. Wisconsin-Court held that a state law or agency rule permitting probation officers to search probationers' homes without a warrant and based on reasonable suspicion is not unconstitutional; the court also ruled that evidence seized by parole officers during an illegal search and seizure need not be excluded at a parole revocation hearing (exclusionary rule does not apply)

Front 30

Warrantless Actions Based on Consent*******MC

Back 30

consent is one clear-cut situation in which absolutely no justification or "balancing act" is required in order to decide on the constitutionality of a search; when a person consents to a search, no justification is required- this is known as consent search; consensual searches must be voluntary

Front 31

The Voluntariness Requirement

Back 31

under Warrantless Actions Based on Consent; the general rule is that validly obtained consent justifies a warrantless search with or without probable cause; however, for consent to be valid, it must be voluntary; if consent is the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, it is not voluntary; consent to search may be valid even if the consenting party is unaware of the fact that he or she can refuse consent

Front 32

Scope of Consent Searches

Back 32

under Warrantless Actions Based on Consent; limited to the terms of the consent

Front 33

Third-Party Consent

Back 33

under Warrantless Actions Based on Consent; the general rule is that wives and husbands can give consent to have their partner's property searched and parents can give consent to have their children's property searched, but children cannot give consent to have their parent's property searched; third pary consent can be given if: the third party individual possesses "common authority" over the area to be searched and the nonconsenting party (roommate) is not present; common authority rests on "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes"; landlords cannot give consent to search property rented to another person, hotel clerks cannot give consent to search guests' rooms, and college officials cannot give consent to search students' dormitories; however, consent given by the driver of a vehicle to search any part of the vehicle is valid, even if the driver is not the owner of the vehicle