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52 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Colgrove v. Green (1946)
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* IL vote dilution case
* Frankfurter doesn't want to be in the political thicket |
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What determines a political thicket?
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* Ruling would cause crisis
* Remedy belongs to coordinate branch of gov't |
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Baker v. Carr (1962)
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* TN vote dilution
* Brennan's 6 factor political question test * Clark concurrence - crazy quilt created by an issue that has no other means of redress. |
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Brennan's 6 factor political question test
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PPULDD
* POTENTIAL for embarrassment from opposing pronouncements * Decision must include POLICY determination * UNUSUAL need to for adherence to political decision * LACK of Standard * DEMONSTRABLE constitutional commitment * Decision would DISRESPECT coordinate branch |
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Westbury v. Sander (1964)
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* Establishes equipopulousness based on Article I, §2.
* Different rules for different levels of gov't |
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Reynolds v. Sims (1964)
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* Establishes that state legislative districts must be roughly equipopulous per 14th amendment.
* Establishes that right to vote is preservative of all other rights * Under 14th Amendment EP, people have right to equal representation in both houses of state legislatures. |
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Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of the State of Colorado
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* Colorado votes on reapportionment
* Majority found that an individual's right to vote cannot be put to referendum * Concurrence noted that affirming such a scheme would set dangerous precedent, subjugating minorities away from power thru group vote |
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Karcher v. Daggett (1983)
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* <1% overall relative deviation plan b/c aiming to make pleasantly shaped districts
* Majority notes that there must be race to zero * Between equality and inequality, choose equality * White's dissent - anything under 1% is good enough |
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Vieth v. PA (2003)
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* 19 person differential, clear partisan gerrymander
* Establishes equipopulous rules |
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What are rules to determine equipopulousness?
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* π must show that better plan can be drawn
* State must show that existing plan deviates for legitimate purposes * π must show that their plan reaches the identified objectives as well |
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Legitimate state objectives in redistricting
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CROPP
* COMPACT districts * RESPECTING boundaries * OTHER non-discriminatory purposes * Preserving core of PRIOR districts * PROTECTING incumbents |
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Giles v. Harris (1903)
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* AA isn't allowed to register to vote
* Holmes affirms dismissal on grounds that the issue isn't resolvable in the courts. * Also asserts that even if justicable, court has no power to enforce * Creates tacit support of Jim Crow Laws |
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White Primary Cases
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* Nixon v. Herndon (1927)
* Smith v. Allwright (1944) * Terry v. Adams (1953) |
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Nixon v. Herndon (1927)
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* Executive committee is picking primary nominees
* Holmes finds that it is discriminatory state action as the state has delegated a state power to a discriminatory entity * Requires that there be a convention of some kind * Refrains from getting into 15th Amendments as 14th Amendment is a clearer violation. * Grovey v. Townsend challenges w/ a whites-only convention - SCOTUS lets stand b/c party's exclusion of non-whites isn't state action |
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Smith v. Allwright (1944)
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* Reverses Grovey, Dems won't issue a ballot to AA on grounds that they are private entity and can choose their own members
* SCOTUS holds that as an agent of the state, the Dems cannot be discriminatory * Decided under the 15th Amendment b/c is applicable to state and private entities |
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Terry v. Adams (1953)
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* Jaybird Democratic Primary
* Black's majority - Jaybirds have cleared the field of competition, thus it is state action * Frankfurter's concurrence - State official participation = state approval * Used 15th Amendment analysis |
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Whitcomb v. Chavis (1971)
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* Right to Aggregate - MC case - Center Twp thinks their votes are being diluted
* SCOTUS uses a pseudo-effects test - only source of discriminatory effect is due to racial bloc voting on the part of the electorate * White notes that the districts are drawn per politics, not race. * Doesn't invalidate the scheme b/c lack of proportional representation doesn't necessarily evince vote dilution - someone always loses in an election . . . |
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White v. Regester (1973)
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* Determining whether state legislative scheme is invidiously discriminatory
* SCOTUS finds that lack of proportional representation doesn't evince discrimination * Finds π must show that political processes were not equally open to participation by the groups in question * Uses totality test * Finds that multi-member districts can be unconstitional if they are being used to cancel out the voting strength of minority groups. |
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Zimmer Factors
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DUPE MARA
* history of DISCRIMINATION * UNRESPONSIVE legislators * PREFERENCE for at-large or multi-member districts * large ELECTORAL districts * MAJORITY vote requirements * lack of ACCESS to slating process * lack of RESIDENCY districts * ANTI-single shot provisions |
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Mobile v. Bolden (1980)
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* Commissioners to numbered positions, requiring majority vote - Are AA votes diluted b/c none of the commissioners are of AA choosing?
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Mobile v. Bolden (1980)
Stewart Plurality |
* Enacts purpose test to limit claims by minority complainants
* Test whether/if legislators were motivated by discriminatory purpose * Really a totality of the circumstances test - do all the circumstances add up to evince discriminatory purpose? * Finds no invidious purpose or lack of access to participation. * Evaluates under 14th amendment finding no foundation for §2 or 15th amendment claim |
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Mobile v. Bolden (1980)
Blackmun concurrence |
* There is a discriminatory purpose, but the district court's action was too intrusive in saying that the city gov't must convert to a mayor-counsel system.
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Mobile v. Bolden (1980)
Marshall's dissent |
* Would prefer an effects/ results test as it would be easier for πs to prevail
* Believes that 14th amendment analysis would be more appropriate since a fundamental right is at stake * Reasons that 1P1V analysis only requires a discriminatory effect. |
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Mobile v. Bolden (1980)
Stevens' concurrence |
* Can't litigate every action that adversely impacts some group
* Utilizes Gomillion Test * Structure not the result of routine political decision * Structure has adverse impact on minority group * System unsupported by neutral justification * No guidance for when test is applicable |
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VRA § 2
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* No qualifications or prerequisites to voting imposed that RESULTS in abridgment due to race.
* Violation evinced by TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES that processes not equally open (less participatory opportunity) * Extent to which minority candidates have been elected is component of totality, but doesn't in and of itself, demonstrate a discriminatory effect. |
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Thornberg v. Gingles (1986)
Brennan Plurality |
3 prong test to weed out unfounded claims
1. Minority is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in single member district 2. Minority politically cohesive 3. White majority subverts minority votes/ candidates *πs don't have to show causation, mere correlation should suffice. |
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Thornberg v. Gingles (1986)
O'Connor concurrence/dissent |
* Preconditions are good, but under this scheme they become the whole ball game
* Need to make the real test totality of the circumstances |
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Johnson v. DeGrady (1994)
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* District court finds Gingles met and that additional majority minority districts can be drawn
* Souter's majority states just because a district can be drawn doesn't mean it should be drawn * Lack of a political famine doesn't evince a political feast * Preconditions are more determinative for at-large districts; totality of circumstances more apt for single member (senate/zimmer factors) * Reverses DC court finding that under §2, all majority-minority district that can be drawn should be drawn. |
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Holder v. Hall (1994)
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* Seeks to enlarge county dictatorship to a 5 member council from 1 (20% of pop'n is AA)
* Kennedy found that a violation cannot be found when there's no manageable standard |
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Holder v. Hall (1994)
Thomas' concurrence |
* § 2 exists to ensure universal vote access, not participation or to police vote dilution
* Really, the court needs to stay out of the political thicket - it's a mess and it jeopardizes the court's impartiality by getting involved. * §2 allows the court to gerrymander by race and heighten racial tensions |
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VRA § 5
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* Provides a check on local officials at every step of the way.
* Only applies to certain areas |
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What must a covered district do if they wish to institute a voting change?
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* Submit changes to AG or DC District Court for preclearance
* Fed review to make sure no discrimnatory purpose or effect (no retrogression) * Voting schemes frozen in place unless preclearance granted |
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How are § 5 enforcement actions constructed?
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* π is private citizen
* ∆ is covered jurisdiction * Cases often filed in local District Court * Burden proof upon π to show that practice involves non-pre-cleared change in voting * No discrimination necessary |
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How are §5 declaratory judgments actions constructed?
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• π is covered jurisdiction seeking change
* ∆ is USAG * Suit filed in DC district court * Question is whether change is discriminatory in purpose/effect * π has burden of persuasion to show there's no discriminatory purpose or effect |
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Allen v. State Board of Education (1969)
Majority |
What needs § 5 preclearance?
* Focuses on all actions necessary to make a vote go through * Not just limited to participation |
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Allen v. State Board of Education (1969)
Harlan's concurrence |
* VRA should only be limited to participation as §5 exists to support §4 (eliminating the practices that prevented minority voters from voting in the south)
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Allen v. State Board of Education (1969)
Black's dissent |
* VRA isn't constitutional as it interferes with state sovereignty
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Presley v. Etowah County Commission (1992)
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Commission expanded from 4 members to 6. New members don't have same powers as old ones.
* Kennedy's majority says that changes that only affect distribution of power are not subject to § 5 preclearance - have no impact on voting |
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What is retrogression?
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* Things are worse off in the new scheme than in the old.
* Touchstone of § 5 approval * Measured by ability to control a district |
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Beer v. US (1976)
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What constitutes discriminatory effect?
* Retrogression - if a scheme enhances the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of electoral franchise cannot have the effect of diluting or abridging the right to vote. |
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Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (2000)
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* DC tries to use § 5 purpose test - even if there isn't a discriminatory effect, if the apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color, it is against Constitution.
* Can't force jurisdictions to create more majority-minority districts * Only retrogression is prohibited |
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Shaw v. Reno (1993)
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How does a jurisdiction balance VRA requirements without districting excessively on the basis of race?
* O'Connor's majority opinion - Districts should conform to traditional districting criteria (compactness, contiguousness, respect for political subdivisions) * To find a racial gerrymander, must demonstrate 1. race is predominant factor in districting 2. Strict scrutiny applied to compelling state interest involved. * Found an unconstitutional racial gerrymander |
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Easley v. Cromartie (2001)
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* Contested district redrawn to be more compact, redrawn to be 48% AA, same candidate continues to get elected
* Consideration of AA Dem district as being more reliable dems, not a racial gerrymander * Thomas' dissent - really, we shouldn't be considering race at all |
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Gaffney v. Cummings (1973)
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* Bipartisan gerrymander - SCOTUS stays out of it
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Davis v. Bandemer (1986)
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* IN case
* Court fails to establish manageable standard to what constitutes partisan gerrymander |
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Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004)
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* 19 person difference in overall deviation - equipopularity attained, only partisan gerrymander remains
* SCOTUS doesn't want to get involved (No political thicket!) * Scalia's plurality focuses on who s/b designing the districts; * is aegis of legislature, but without court involved legislatures might run amok. * standard is whether court intervention will produce a better quality of legislators. * Souter proposed a 5 part test for adjudicating partisan gerrymanders * Kennedy wants to continue to adjudicate in case a standard is later discovered |
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Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Elections (1959)
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Literacy test upheld under rational review b/c ability to read bears a legitimate relation to using a ballot
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Harper v. VA Board of Elections (1966)
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* Poll tax in VA, 14th Amend eliminated such in federal elections, VRA instructed AG to go after states still implementing
* Struck down as being facially discriminatory under 14th Amendment EP review |
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Harper v. VA Board of Elections (1966)
Black's Dissent |
* Distinctions drawn and discrimination enacted by states don't violate EP so long as they are not irrational, unreasonable, or invidious.
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Harper v. VA Board of Elections (1966)
Harlan's Dissent |
* There is rational reasoning for instituting a poll tax- they are traditionally part of the mix
* Restrictions on who can/can't vote should only be restricted after wide public debate - like the sufferage debate. |
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Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 (1969)
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* Stockbroker in his parent's basement
* Unjustified discrimination in determining who can/can't participate undermines gov't legitimacy |
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Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 (1969)
Stewart's dissent |
* Must draw line somewhere as to who constitutes an interested party re: school board elections.
* This is a reasonable line. |