Canons Of Statutory Construction

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Absurd / Unreasonable Consequences

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In construing statutes, avoid absurd results

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Agency Interpretation of a Statute

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Interpretation of an agency charged with administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference
(remember: Chevron doctrine and Chevron Two-Step)

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Agency's Earlier Interpretation

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Agency interpretation of a statutory provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view.

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Amendment - Intent to Change the Law

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Where words of a later statute differ from those of a previous one on the same subject, Congress must have expressly intended the statutes to have a different meaning.

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Associated Words Doctrine

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Words grouped together in a list should be given a related meaning.

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Canons (Rules) of Construction

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Congress is presumed to legislate with knowledge of the basic rules of statutory construction.

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Certainty and Definiteness

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A statute is void for vagueness which forbids and requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men and women of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

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Committee Reports

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Indications of congressional intent contained in a conference committee report deserve great deference by the courts. (BUT Scalia)

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Avoid Constitutional Issues

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The Court will construe a statute to avoid a constitutional problem unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.
(Statutes are presumed to be constitutional.)

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Definitions Supplied by the Statute

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Where a statute states what a term means, all other meanings not stated are excluded.

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Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law

Generally

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If Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it must make that intent specific. The statute should generally be read to retain the common law rule.

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Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law

Two Rules

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1) If the statute adds a cause of action, but is silent on whether it is replacing that common law, presume that the statute adds to the common law.
2) If the statute modifies existing common law, the presumption is only one of modification.

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Ejusdem Generis

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When a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration.
NOTE: Courts are normally willing to enforce "catch-alls", but they are generally construed narrowly (non a canon).

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Every word/phrase has a purpose

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A statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.

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Express Mention and Implied Exclusion

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1) Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.
2) The use of the word "including" indicates that the specific list which follows is illustrative, not exclusive.

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Identical words used throughout the statute

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Identical words in different parts of the same act are presumed to have the same meaning, but this presumption may be rebutted if the word's meaning must vary in order to meet the purposes of the law.

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Knowledge of Existing Law

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The court assumes that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.

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Language of the Statue

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Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself.

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Later legislative construction of statutes

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The view of a later Congress does not establish the definitive meaning of an earlier enactment, but it has persuasive value.

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Legislative History

Rules 1 & 2

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1) Legislative history is mere evidence of what the legislative intent may be. The only act of Congress that reflects the majority statement is the act itself.
2) In the absence of a conflict between the reasonably plain meaning of a statute and the legislative history, the words of the statute must prevail.

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Legislative History

Rules 3 & 4

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3) The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.
4) Does the legislative history exhibit a "clearly expressed legislative intention" contrary to the chosen language?

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Liberal v. Strict Construction

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1) Civil Statutes - Remedial = Remedial legislation should be given a liberal construction to effectuate its statutory purpose (unless clear intent to the contrary)
2) Criminal Statute - Rule of Lenity = Where there is an ambiguity in a criminal statute, all doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant (use at the end of the process)
3) Tax Statutes = Generally, any doubt in the application of a tax statute is to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.
NOTE = use these only when left with two or more reasonable interpretations

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Mistakes in Writing, Grammar, Spelling, and Punctuation

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Punctuation is not decisive, but it is useful in reaffirming conclusions drawn from the words of the statute.

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"or" and "and"

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"or":
Terms connected by a disjunctive should be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise.

"and":
The word "and" is to be accepted for its conjunctive connotation rather than as a word interchangeable with "or" except where a strict grammatical construction would frustrate clear legislative intent.

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Other States or Countries

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It is presumed that when Congress adopts the wording of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction, it carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the borrowed statute.

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Preamble

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A preamble contributes to the general understanding of a statute but is not an operative part of the statute and does not enlarge or confer powers on administrative agencies or officers.

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Reenactment after an agency interpretation or judicial interpretation

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1) When Congress reenacts a statute, it voices approval of an administrative interpretation thereof, and Congress is treated as having adopted that interpretation and the Supreme Court is bound thereby.
2) Congress is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change.

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Remarks by Other Persons

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Statements by individual legislators do not have controlling effect on statutory interpretations, but when they are consistent with the statutory language and legislative history, they provide evidence of Congress' intent.

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Retroactive Legislation:

Presumption Against Retroactivity

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Congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.
a) The presumption is that the statute applies beginning on its date of enactment.
b) Congress may however apply the statute retrospectively (all future/pending lawsuits).

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Retroactive Legislation:

Final Judgment & Lawsuits not commenced or pending

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Final Judgment: The law may never affect the final or appealable judgment.

Not commenced or is pending: The law must be obeyed unless its application would result in a manifest injustice to one party.

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Settled legal meaning of undefined terms

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Where Congress uses terms that have an accumulated settled meaning under common law, the court must infer, unless statute dictates otherwise, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of those terms.

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Severance

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A statutory provision is presumed severable if what remains after severance is fully operative as law.

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"shall" and "may"

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1) "shall" generally indicates mandatory intent
2) "may" usually implies some degree of discretion
3) The words "may" and "shall" are also understood to confer a power

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Sovereign Applicability

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In common usage, the term "person" does not include the sovereign and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it.

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"Spirit of the Law"

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A court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute.

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Sponsors' Statements

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The statement of one of the legislation's sponsors deserves to be awarded substantial weight in interpreting a statute.

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Statute as a Whole

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In determining the meaning of a statute, the Court looks not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a while and to its objective and policy.
NOTE = Don't construe statutory phrases in isolation.

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Technical Words or Terms of Art

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Technical terms or terms of art used in a statute are presumed to have their technical meaning.
NOTE = If the ordinary meaning of the word fits better with the statute, this presumption may be rebutted.

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Title

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1) The title of a statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity.
2) Titles do not expand the meaning of a statute, they may be helpful in interpreting ambiguities within the context of a statute.

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Two or More Statutes on Point
(In Pari Materia)

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1) If two statutes can co-exist, the courts should regard each as effective absent clear intent to the contrary.
2) The more recent of two irreconcilable statutes governs. (only use if they cannot co-exist)

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Two or More Statutes on Point
(In Pari Materia)

A General and Specific Statute

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1) A specific statute is not controlled or nullified by a general statute regardless of the priority of the enactment (absent clear intent otherwise).
2) The specific statute is given precedence over the general.

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Two or more statutes with a common purpose

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When two statutes share a common purpose and where the language used is very similar, a Court is warrant in concluding that Congress intended a similar construction of the two provisions.

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Common, ordinary meaning

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Unless otherwise defined, the words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary meaning.
NOTE = unless it does not fit the clear congressional intent

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Words Omitted

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The trial court cannot omit or add to the plain meaning of the statute.
(i.e., the court cannot merely assume the legislature meant something other than what it said)