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99 Cards in this Set

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Munn v. Illinois*

1876. SCOTUS. Court establishes the principle of public regulation of private businesses in the public interest. Legal actions are presumed valid and constitutional, and the burden is on the person challenging the action to prove otherwise. Case addressed licensing for grain storage facilities. Property can become clothed in a public interest when used in a manner that has public consequence.

Mugler v. Kansas*

1887. An early SCOTUS nuisance case and early example of regulation of land use. Mugler claims state prohibition of liquor making is a taking without compensation. Court says that a regulation reasonable related to a valid public purpose is not a taking. This view changes in PA Coal v. Mahon (1922).

United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway*

1896. SCOTUS holds that use of eminent domain to buy a battlefield is a public use and a public purpose. This is the first significant legal case dealing with historic preservation.

Attorney General v. Williams

1903. SCOTUS holds that giving a person a right of action against a city is an adequate provision for compensation in a takings situation. Case involves height limits in Boston but is NOT Welch v. Swasey.

Cochran v. Preston

1908. MD Supreme Court holds that height limits in Baltimore are a valid exercise of police power because the regulations are related to fire suppression ability. Required a substantial relationship between objective of regulation and means of obtaining it.

Welch v. Swasey**

1909. SCOTUS holds that construction standards, and height regulations in particular, that uphold public safety are a valid exercise of the police power, so long as standards are reasonable and not arbitrary. Involves height limits in Boston.

Eubank v. City of Richmond*

1912. SCOTUS Equal Protection case. A situation where neighboring property owners established a setback on a street results in a violation of equal protection and due process. This case invalidates the setback in question, but generally recognizes the validity of this kind of regulation.

Hadacheck v. Sebastian**

1915. SCOTUS early nuisance case and example of regulation of location of land uses. LA bans brickyards, and later annexes a brickyard and forces it to close. Court upholds this action, saying "if private interests are in the way of progress, they must yield to the good of the community."

Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago*

1917. SCOTUS upholds an ordinance that requires owners to obtain permission from block neighbors for signs over a certain size, when block is >50% residential. Cusack claims an unlawful delegation of power, Court says due process and equal protection not violated. Difference from Eubank is that residents are waiving a requirement, not imposing one.

Town of Windsor v. Whitney et. al.

1920. CT Supreme Court. Due process clause does not prevent municipalities from making all needful regulations for public welfare and does not require compensation where reasonable. Town sues to restrain Whitney from subdividing land against the pattern put forth in the plan for the town.

Romar Realty v. Board of Commissioners

1921. NJ Supreme Court. Court invalidates ordinance relating building height to setback lines, because "desire to beautify is a luxury, not a necessity." Regulation not reasonably related to public welfare..

Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon***

1922. SCOTUS finds for the first time that a regulation can create a "regulatory taking." Before this, only physical invasion of property considered a taking. However, this case does NOT establish compensation as a remedy. Invalidating the law or regulation is the remedy.

Inspector of Building of Lowell v. Stoklosa

1924. MA Courts. Lowell seeks to stop construction of a business in a residential zone. Court upholds. Provision that allows for exceptions in 3/4 of property owners agree is not an unlawful delegation of power because it was a condition of a public hearing and not the deciding factor.

Zahn v. Los Angeles

1925. CA Supreme Court. Zoning Ordinance upheld and court notes that grandfathered uses are not a reason to invalidate regulation of similar new uses. Fair and impartial application of an ordinance is valid, and loss of value of land is acceptable outcome.

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty***

1926. SCOTUS upholds constitutionality of zoning. Alfred Bettmann writes influential amicus brief.

Washington Ex. Rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge

1928. SCOTUS holds that ordinance is an unwarranted delegation of power to property owners w/o any standard or rule prescribed by legislative action. Different from Cusack, because signs canbe nuisances, where in Roberge, housing for elderly is not.

Nectow v. City of Cambridge**

1928. SCOTUS. An arbitrarily placed zoning line (that was actually drawn in error) is invalidated. With Euclid, establishes concepts of reasonable use and regulations that have to be rationally tied to a valid public purpose - the lower level scrutiny of the rational basis test.

Jones v. City of Los Angeles

1930. CA Supreme Court. Court invalidates an ordinance that retroactively prohibits existing uses that are not nuisances. Decision used later in LA v. Gage. Specific case revolves around asylums not being grandfathered in.

Dowsey v. Kensington

1931. NY Appeals Court. Court invalidates zoning ordinance which restricts business and industry to land wholly unsuited for it. Impossible to draw precise line between legitimate/illegitimate use of police power, so case-by-case analysis of facts needed.

Welton v. Hamilton

1931. IL Supreme Court. Procedural due process case. ZO gives the appeals board the unfettered authority to approve and/or vary zoning, with no criteria to justify setting aside provisions. This amounts to an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to an administrative board.

Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp*

1932. NY Supreme Court. Nuisance case that claims Bove should have known, based on the area's geography and transportation connections, that she was building in an industrial location. Coke ovens operation okay. Does establish the idea that owners cannot make unreasonable use of his premises to the material annoyance of neighbors.

U.S. v. Certain Lands, City of Louisville, Kentucky*

1935. US District Court. Court holds that federal government does not hold power of eminent domain for slum clearance under NIRA. Case that is responsible, in part, for federal shift from direct provision of low-income housing to subsidization programs.

New York City Housing Authority v. Muller*

1936. NY Appeals Court. Case holds that Certain Lands decision only applies to federal gov. New York City government may take private land for redevelopment because the project is conceived and carried out in its own interest and for its own protection, which equals a public purpose and a public use. Some count this as the birth of urban redevelopment/renewal.

Austin v. Older*

1938. MI Supreme Court. Gas station built one day before ZO enacted, and now wants to expand. Court holds that expansion of a non-conforming use may be limited when specific circumstances show reason. In this case, the expansion would have brought the station w/in ten feet of a residence.

People Tuohy v. City of Chicago

1946. IL Supreme Court. A $5M bond issue for slum clearance is challenged. Court upholds issue, saying that the taking is not for a private use because Chicago is leasing the land, and leasing is a public power.

Ayres v. City of Los Angeles

1949. CA Supreme Court. Plaintiff objects to 4 conditions of subdivision approval. Court says all four were reasonably related to public protection and had a legal nexus between conditions imposed and the burden proposed development would place on roadways. Triangular lot with four road frontages.

Lordship Park Assoc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals

1950. CT Supreme Court. Procedural due process case. Decisions made using a draft plan that was never formally adopted for open to public review or determination of public interest is a violation of due process.

Miller v. City of Beaver Falls

1951. PA Supreme Court. Official Map case. Lengthy reservations of land through official map process are takings.

Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne*

1952. NJ Supreme Court. Deals with presumption of validity of ordinances, in this case one establishing minimum home sizes.

Fischer v. Bedminster Township

1952. NJ Supreme Court. Upholds ordinance establishing large minimum lot sizes. Notes plaintiff could have applied for a variance.

Akron v. Chapman

1953. OH Supreme Court says that the right to continue a non-conforming use falls under Article 4 of US Constitution and Article 1 of OH Const. Due process violated by requiring amortization of nonconforming uses.

Berman v. Parker***

1954. SCOTUS upholds the use of eminent domain for aesthetic purposes and for eventual private end use. Very broad interpretation of police power: spiritual, physical, and aesthetic values as well as health, safety, welfare, and morals.

Harbison v. City of Buffalo

1958. NY Appeals Court. Court holds that phasing out non-conforming uses is okay if loss to owner is insubstantial, or if public benefits are greater than detriment to owner. Okay to limit enlargements.

National Land v. Kohn*

1965. PA Supreme Court. Court invalidates 4-acre minimum lot sizes because municipality is "in the path of development." Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms establishes that PA municipalities must accommodate their fair share of growth.

Jenad v. Village of Scarsdale

1966. NY Appeals Court. Court upholds requirement of park land dedication or a fee in lieu. Says its a valid exercise of police power as long as municipality shows schools, parks, playgrounds, etc. will be needed.

Jones v. Mayer*

1968. US Supreme Court. Court holds that all citizens have same right to inherit, buy, sell, lease, hold, and convey real and personal property under s.1982 of Fair Housing Act. S.1982 bars both private and public discrimination and is a valid exercise of Congressional power to enforce 13th Amendment.

Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc.*

1968. Court upholds PUD ordinance, states that the PUD ordinance approved by Borough Council did NOT provide too much discretion to New Hope Planning Commission.

Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders

1970. PA Supreme Court. Court strikes down minimum lot sizes that appeared to be arbitrary, as they had no connection to the supposed reason for the regulation, i.e., sewerage.

Serrano v. Priest

1971. SCOTUS said CA method of financing public education through property taxes is discriminatory and furthers no compelling state interest. Violation of equal protection due to disparities in tax revenues.

Golden v. Town of Ramapo***

1972. NY Appeals Court. The court upheld a growth management system that awarded points to development proposals based on the availability of public utilities. Case adds timing and sequencing to two existing dimensions of zoning: type and location of land uses.

Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission**

1971. SCOTUS overturns an approval for a nuclear power plant due to failure to follow requirements of NEPA. First case to show the teeth in NEPA

James v. Valtierra

1971. US Supreme Court. Referendum/housing discrimination case. Court upholds an amendment to the CA Constitution requiring a referendum on all housing projects because an intent to discriminate was not found.

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe*

1971. SCOTUS establishes "hard look" doctrine for environmental impact review. Section 4(f) of Department of Transportation Act of 1982 prohibits use of federal funds to finance construction of highways through parkland, unless two conditions are met- no reasonable alternatives exist and all possible planning to minimize harm has occurred.

Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill*

1978. US Supreme Court makes first interpretation of Endangered Species Act. Case halts construction of nearly-completed Tellico Dam after endangered fish is found upstream. Later amendments to ESA introduce flexibility.

Sierra Club v. Morton**

1972. SCOTUS issues ruling on standing in environmental cases. Sierra Club lost the case, but won the war, as environmental groups only need to find one member with a personal interest in the threatened area to have standing to sue.

Just v. Marinette County**

1972. WI Supreme Court. A wetlands case that introduces theories of public trust (wetland functions are held in public trust) to regulatory schemes. Court upholds ZO that limits filling of wetlands without a special permit.

Fasano v. County Commissioners of Washington County***

1973. OR Supreme Court. Holds that zoning must be consistent with comp plans. Also shifts burden of proof to the party seeking a change in zoning, since this is an exercise of judicial authority instead of legislative. Makes rezonings an exception to the general rule of presuming a general zoning ordinance valid.

Board of Supervisors of Fairfax Co. v. Snell Construction Corporation

1974. VA Supreme Court. Land is upzoned, and then downzoned after an election. Court invalidates ordinance because no change to the public interest occurred in the interim to justify the change.

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas***

1974. SCOTUS holds that defining family as blood relatives or no more than two unrelated people is constitutional. No deprivation of a fundamental right. Goal of reg permissible under Berman, where public interest extends well beyond health, safety, and welfare.

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I)***

1975. NJ Supreme Court. Court holds that clear economic discrimination exists in Mount Laurel's ZO. Town ordered to provide for low-income housing, as are all NJ communities that are growing in population. Violation of equal protection clause.

Baker v. City of Milwaukie

1975. OR Supreme Court. Citizen sues to make existing ZO comply with new comp plan. Court says a comp plan is legislative and town has a duty to implement it through ZO.

Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma***

1975. US District Appeals Ct. Leading CA case upholding growth management regs. Petaluma fixed rate of growth at 500 units per year for 5 years.

Warth v. Seldin*

1975. SCOTUS addresses standing in exclusionary zoning cases, states that person must how facts demonstrating that they're a proper party to seek judicial relief, and would benefit from judicial intervention. Eliminated almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff, i.e., non-residents seeking housing, center city residents paying higher taxes, suburban residents seeking diverse communities.

Carla Hills v. Dorothy Gautreaux*

1976. SCOTUS upholds lower court finding that Chicago Housing Authority and HUD discriminated in the placement of public housing in Chicago. Lower court orders solution that involves housing outside of Chicago proper. SCOTUS agrees that inter-district relief is okay in housing discrimination cases.

City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises**

1976. Referendum case. SCOTUS upholds the OH Constitution, which gives the people referendum power over any question municipalities can control by legislation. The people reserved the power unto themselves, so it is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

Coleman Young, Mayor of Detroit v. American Mini Theatres**

1976. SCOTUS upholds Detroit ordinance that requires dispersion of adult uses. Not a violation of 1st Amendment, nor is it a violation based on licensing requirements.

Associated Homebuilders of Greater East Bay v. Livermore**

1976. CA Supreme Court. Livermore passes a building permit moratorium through referendum. Court upholds it. Case looks favorably on limits on development based on capital improvements, especially when linked to a planning process.

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development Corp.***

1977. SCOTUS holds that while Arlington's ZO may be unintentionally discriminatory, Metro did not show intent to discriminate and so the ZO is constitutional. However, intent to discriminate based on race, immigration status, or national origin IS unconstitutional. And, discrimination based on gender or illegitimacy must substantially advance a state interest and be passed without an intent to discriminate.

Oakwood at Madison v. Township of Madison

1977. NJ Supreme Court. Court holds that Mount Laurel applies as it is a growing community and that PUD ordinance is exclusionary.

Moore v. City of East Cleveland***

1977. SCOTUS holds that ordinance limiting the number of blood relatives that can live together violates due process.

Penn Central Transport Co. v. City of New York***

1978. SCOTUS holds that denial of permit to build a skyscraper over Grand Central Station is not a taking. Law permits present use and a reasonable return on investments made. Especially since air rights were transferrable. Upholds NYC's Landmarks Preservation Law.

Agins v. City of Tiburon*

1980. SCOTUS addresses ripeness of facial attacks on ordinances. Developers had not applied for permit. States that a law impacting property rights must "substantially advance" a legitimate state interest.

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v. Public Service Commission*

1980. SCOTUS establishes Central Hudson test for commercial speech, a four step analysis.


Is the regulation content neutral? If no, subject to strict scrutiny test (compelling state interest). If yes, intermediate scrutiny of substantially advancing a state interest applies, and regulation must also allow a reasonable alternative means of communication, be as narrowly defined as possible, and limited to reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner of speech.

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego***

1981. SCOTUS holds than an ordinance that bans all off-premise signs violates 1st Amendment because it effectively bans non-commercial speech on billboards/off-premise signs.

Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV Corp***

1982. SCOTUS holds that any physical invasion of property, no matter how small, is a taking. Right to exclude others is one of the most fundamental property rights.

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II)***

1983. NJ Supreme Court. Rules that all NJ municipalities must build fair share of affordable housing, even if not in a growing area. Leads to NJ Fair Housing Act (1985) and has been called most important civil rights case since Brown v. Board of Education (1954).

Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent*

1984. SCOTUS upholds LA ordinance that bans signs attached to utility poles. Says that ordinance met all tests under Central Hudson (1980).

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff*

1984. SCOTUS upholds Hawaii's use of eminent domain to transfer land from massive landholders to leasees. Holds that eminent domain is coterminous with the police power because it is a tool to enact actions taken under police power. See also Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, where MI SC upholds an EDC taking land for a GM plant.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center**

1985. SCOTUS holds that ZO requiring special permit for group homes is discriminatory because similar uses did not require permits. Classes mental retardation outside the quasi-suspect class, which means legislation simply must meet rational basis test.

Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank*

1985. SCOTUS addresses ripeness of takings claim. Hamilton Bank did not attempt to get variances from the zoning provisions creating the takings nor had they attempted to get compensation from TN state statutory provisions. SCOTUS has continued to apply this case to equal protection and substantive due process claims. Two-pronged test: (1) has a final decision been reached by gov't agency, and (2) have all state-provided procedures for compensation been tried and denied?

City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters**

1986. SCOTUS upholds a ZO that limits adult uses to 5% of land area. Renton used a Seattle study showing negative effects of adult uses. Did not have to show that reasonable alternative locations existed. ZO also passed Central Hudson test. No 1st or 14th amendment violations.

Keystone Bituminous Coal v. De Benedictus**

1987. SCOTUS dramatically alters the regulatory taking theory in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon as it applies to coal subsidence. Court upholds a statute quite similar to the one it overturned in 1922. Difference in how each act defined property - Keystone uses much broader scope for defining property value.

1st English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles***

1987. SCOTUS holds that monetary damages are an initial remedy for an inverse condemnation suit, overruling Agins v. Tiburon, which said that monetary damages are a remedy only if government continues restriction which causes the taking. In 1st English, the temporary loss of use was enough to qualify for damages.

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission***

1987. SCOTUS requires that any condition imposed (an exaction) must have a rational nexus to a legitimate state interest.

Cohen v. Des Plaines

1990. SCOTUS holds that zoning cannot give churches an advantage over commercial uses. Strikes down an ordinance allowing church daycares where commercial ones are not permitted.

Oregon v. Smith

The facially neutral regulation of religious services is okay as long as the religion itself is not hindered. SCOTUS upholds a ban on the use of peyote in Native American religious services.

Restigouche v. Juniper

1995. US Court of Appeals. An ordinance requiring neotraditional design elements in upheld as an appropriate use of the police power.

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council***

1992. SCOTUS holds that a taking categorically occurs when all economically beneficial use of the land is denied - does not even need to consider whether the regulation advances a legitimate state interest.

Dolan v. City of Tigard***

1994. SCOTUS holds that even if there is a rational nexus between exaction and state interest, it may still be a taking if the regulation is not roughly proportional to the impact of the development. In this case, requiring dedication of flood plain goes far beyond impact of the development.

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon*

1995. SCOTUS defines Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act to include loss or modification of habitat in the definition of "harm" to an endangered species.

City of Edmonds v. Oxford House**

1995. SCOTUS determines that maximum occupancy restrictions are permissible under the Fair Housing Act. Limitations of family composition are not.

City of Boerne v. Flores

1997. SCOTUS rules that 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act is unconstitutional because it lies beyond the legislative authority of Congress.

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

1997. SCOTUS says takings claim is ripe, despite plaintiff not attempting to make use of available transferrable development rights. Remanded, saying lower court should consider the second prong of the two-part test from Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank.

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes

1999. SCOTUS applies rough proportionality test to takings clause. Upholds the award of $1.45M in damages where the city had denied development repeatedly despite being in conformance with comp plan and zoning, depriving the owner of all economically viable use of the land.

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech*

2000. An individual can be a "class of one" when claiming violation of the equal protection clause. Violation occurs when government treats one differently from others similarly situated AND there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment, even if there is no ill will or vindictivenes shown on the part of the government.

City of Erie v. Paps A.M.*

2000. Freedom of expression not violated by regulations requiring minimal clothing of exotic dancers.

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*

2001. SCOTUS holds that a takings analysis is not irrelevant simply because new owner acquired property after regulations became effective. Palazzolo claimed inverse condemnation, after being denied permit to fill 18 acres of coastal wetlands.

San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill

2002. US District Court. Claim under RLUIPA not successful. RLUIPA is not an exemption from land use regulations. Burden is allowed if it furthers a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive way of furthering that interest. SJCC gave no evidence showing it was burdened, or that Morgan Hill treated churches unequally.

City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books

2002. Court upholds LA ban on more than one adult use in the same building because of evidence that shows negative secondary effects of concentrated adult uses.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Association***

2002. SCOTUS holds that the "mere enactment" of moratoriums is not a takings. Moratoria imposed during the preparation of a comp plan are not categorical takings. Courts must weigh particular circumstances of each case.

Kelo v. New London***

2005. SCOTUS upholds a CT takings case where land was taken for private redevelopment as per Berman. Bad political reaction has led to many states limiting eminent domain use to strictly public end uses.

Lingle v. Chevron***

2005. SCOTUS holds that the "substantially advances" test created by Agins is actually a test for due process, not a takings test.

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams*

2005. SCOTUS determines that monetary damages are not a remedy under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco**

2005. SCOTUS holds that states can adjudicate challenges to land use decisions, and that plaintiffs are not entitled to cases in both federal and state court systems.

Rapanos v. United States**

2006. SCOTUS holds the Army Corps must show that wetlands have a significant nexus to navigable waters to be within their jurisdiction.

Massachusetts v. EPA**

2006. SCOTUS holds that the EPA must provide a reasonable justification for why they would not regulate greenhouse gases.

S.D. Warren v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection

2006. SCOTUS holds that hydroelectric dams are subject to Section 401 of the Clean Water Act. Lumber milling company dams require Section 401 permit for any discharge.E

Environmental Defense Council v. Duke Energy Corp.

2007. SCOTUS considers Clean Air Act. Duke argues that permit not necessary because average emissions were not changing. However, court rules that any major modification requires a permit. One of several 2006-2007 rulings that clarify Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. FL Department of Environmental Protection**

2010. SCOTUS upholds state law that governs renourishment of beaches and gives state ownership to renourished portions of beaches. Found that filling submerged lands did not represent a taking. Interestingly, four justices agreed with the novel theory that a judicial ruling on a question of state property could create a compensible taking.