In Nagel’s reflection on what it’s like to be a bat, he delves into a number of aspects of the mind-body issue, demonstrating just how complex the concept is. In his argument, Nagel highlights that consciousness, or lack thereof in some arguments, is at the centre of the mind-body problem, and that is what makes it so difficult to approach and pinpoint. Nagel’s argument spans a number of different topics, analyzing the existence of consciousness and discussing physicalism, behaviourism, and more. Among analyzing Nagel’s argument, I will also look into the bearing that the argument has on what Ryle calls ‘Descartes’ Myth’.
What is consciousness? While there is no clear definition for it, as it is a rather complex and curious thing. A human being is considered conscious if there is something that it is …show more content…
Nagel does not render physicalism either true or false, but instead believes there is no clear classification. It is not possible to exclude phenomenological factors when describing consciousness or the mind-body relationship, as one would with a chemical or physical reduction. With physical and chemical phenomena, we explain the phenomenological feature of that phenomenon as effects on the human observers. An example of this would be the feeling of pain when one gets a paper cut. The paper cut is the ordinary phenomena, and the phenomenological feature of it is the feeling of pain. What Nagel argues is that in order for physicalism to be true, it must be able to provide a physical explanation for the effects of consciousness. This in and of itself seems impossible. The subjective character of experience, also known as what it feels like to be an organism, is accessible from only one point of view, and it seems highly inevitable that an objective, physical theory would ever abandon that specific point of
What is consciousness? While there is no clear definition for it, as it is a rather complex and curious thing. A human being is considered conscious if there is something that it is …show more content…
Nagel does not render physicalism either true or false, but instead believes there is no clear classification. It is not possible to exclude phenomenological factors when describing consciousness or the mind-body relationship, as one would with a chemical or physical reduction. With physical and chemical phenomena, we explain the phenomenological feature of that phenomenon as effects on the human observers. An example of this would be the feeling of pain when one gets a paper cut. The paper cut is the ordinary phenomena, and the phenomenological feature of it is the feeling of pain. What Nagel argues is that in order for physicalism to be true, it must be able to provide a physical explanation for the effects of consciousness. This in and of itself seems impossible. The subjective character of experience, also known as what it feels like to be an organism, is accessible from only one point of view, and it seems highly inevitable that an objective, physical theory would ever abandon that specific point of