Because of the uniqueness and complexity of Indonesia’s initial conditions Horowitz does not make any bold claims about the replicability of that country’s constitutional experience. He does, however, contend that Indonesia’s form of constitutional development was particularly suited for promoting democracy in that country. Given the role sequencing, incrementalism, and path dependency played in Horowitz’s narrative, additional research within a historical institutionalism vein might provide some transferable lessons. There are likely opportunities for conducting cross-country analysis between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to better determine if Indonesia is as unique as Horowitz claims. There are several social, political,
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Key to completing this process was the successful translation of Indonesia’s multiple social cleavages into a system of party multipolarity. According to Horowitz, this multiparty arrangement bridged Indonesia’s social cleavages by fragmenting power at the center and creating strong centripetal forces that bypassed regionalism. This helped to minimize polarization and mitigate potential conflict between large social groups. However, recent actions by larger parties to lock in advantages by drafting tougher registration requirements and higher electoral thresholds has the potential to threaten party multipolarity. Current measures aimed at reducing the number of political parties may result in …show more content…
Towards the end of his book, Horowitz comments on the low quality of Indonesia’s democracy. One of the factors he cites is the fact that party multipolarity makes it difficult to dismiss a judge or provide a check on independent courts. The insider-led constitutional process resulted in many judges from the Suharto era retaining their positions, and party fragmentation has stymied efforts to combat judiciary corruption. If corruption of the judiciary is so widespread as to render irrelevant the use of formal politics to roll back judicial independence, why bother with a political or constitutional crisis when you can just buy a judge when you need a decision? More research may be needed in this area to determine in what ways a corrupt judiciary counteracts the rule of law or takes advantage of party
Key to completing this process was the successful translation of Indonesia’s multiple social cleavages into a system of party multipolarity. According to Horowitz, this multiparty arrangement bridged Indonesia’s social cleavages by fragmenting power at the center and creating strong centripetal forces that bypassed regionalism. This helped to minimize polarization and mitigate potential conflict between large social groups. However, recent actions by larger parties to lock in advantages by drafting tougher registration requirements and higher electoral thresholds has the potential to threaten party multipolarity. Current measures aimed at reducing the number of political parties may result in …show more content…
Towards the end of his book, Horowitz comments on the low quality of Indonesia’s democracy. One of the factors he cites is the fact that party multipolarity makes it difficult to dismiss a judge or provide a check on independent courts. The insider-led constitutional process resulted in many judges from the Suharto era retaining their positions, and party fragmentation has stymied efforts to combat judiciary corruption. If corruption of the judiciary is so widespread as to render irrelevant the use of formal politics to roll back judicial independence, why bother with a political or constitutional crisis when you can just buy a judge when you need a decision? More research may be needed in this area to determine in what ways a corrupt judiciary counteracts the rule of law or takes advantage of party