In ‘The Subjectivity of Values’, J L Mackie examines error theory and objective morality vs non-cognitivism. Mackie’s report represents moral scepticism using moral error theory. By taking an error theory approach, Mackie confronts morality similarly to the manner in which an atheist confronts religion. Moral error theory could be broken down to a version of the Justified True Belief outline as follows:
Moral claims are universally false
There is reason to believe that moral claims are universally false
There is no justification for believing any deniable claim
Therefore, there is no justification for believing moral claims
Mackie rejects non-cognitivism; according to his error theory, moral claims are uniformly false. He attempts to justify …show more content…
In Mackie’s perspective, contrasting with non-cognitivism, moral claims can be either true or false; however, he believes that all such claims are false. Mackie refutes non-cognitivism in regards to ethics, stating that ethics ‘is more a matter of knowledge and less a matter of decision than any non-cognitive analysis allows’ (p 16). Therefore, he believes that objective values do not exist; the first sentence of this chapter states his claim: ‘there are no objective values’. He believes that objective values are ‘not part of the fabric of the world’. Objective values could be defined as values that exist beyond the individual, regardless of personal beliefs, desires and/or perception; ie. personal beliefs etc. do not deny claims. Thus, moral objectivism believes in the existence of objective values; it alleges that moral claims are true without regard to personal beliefs. In his linguistic thesis, Mackie believes that ordinary moral judgments ‘include a claim to objectivity, …show more content…
In establishing the argument from relativity, Mackie realises that moral policies and customs vary amongst different societies and cultures, or in fact even ‘between different groups and classes within a complex community’ (p 18). Mackie realises that moral disagreement alone does not provide sufficient evidence for or against objective values; these differences are prevalent in concentrations such as ‘history, biology, or cosmology’ yet in these concentrations the differences or disagreements are not indicative of the presence, or lack thereof, of objective issues within those concentrations. However, Mackie does draw a line between the above mentioned concentrations and meta-ethics, stating that historical and scientific disagreements are usually the result of speculation or hypotheses built upon insufficient or invalid evidence. This explanation could not be similarly applied to a meta-ethical inquiry. Mackie suggests the following two hypotheses to explain the discrepancies between different moral
Moral claims are universally false
There is reason to believe that moral claims are universally false
There is no justification for believing any deniable claim
Therefore, there is no justification for believing moral claims
Mackie rejects non-cognitivism; according to his error theory, moral claims are uniformly false. He attempts to justify …show more content…
In Mackie’s perspective, contrasting with non-cognitivism, moral claims can be either true or false; however, he believes that all such claims are false. Mackie refutes non-cognitivism in regards to ethics, stating that ethics ‘is more a matter of knowledge and less a matter of decision than any non-cognitive analysis allows’ (p 16). Therefore, he believes that objective values do not exist; the first sentence of this chapter states his claim: ‘there are no objective values’. He believes that objective values are ‘not part of the fabric of the world’. Objective values could be defined as values that exist beyond the individual, regardless of personal beliefs, desires and/or perception; ie. personal beliefs etc. do not deny claims. Thus, moral objectivism believes in the existence of objective values; it alleges that moral claims are true without regard to personal beliefs. In his linguistic thesis, Mackie believes that ordinary moral judgments ‘include a claim to objectivity, …show more content…
In establishing the argument from relativity, Mackie realises that moral policies and customs vary amongst different societies and cultures, or in fact even ‘between different groups and classes within a complex community’ (p 18). Mackie realises that moral disagreement alone does not provide sufficient evidence for or against objective values; these differences are prevalent in concentrations such as ‘history, biology, or cosmology’ yet in these concentrations the differences or disagreements are not indicative of the presence, or lack thereof, of objective issues within those concentrations. However, Mackie does draw a line between the above mentioned concentrations and meta-ethics, stating that historical and scientific disagreements are usually the result of speculation or hypotheses built upon insufficient or invalid evidence. This explanation could not be similarly applied to a meta-ethical inquiry. Mackie suggests the following two hypotheses to explain the discrepancies between different moral