In a 2003 article entitled Competitive Advantage the Toyota way, Toyota is highly touted for its ability to create a competitive advantage with limited capital resource and the appropriate usage of human and capital resources (Fane, Vaghefi, Van Deusen & Wood, 2003). This information from 2003 is relevant because it was the predecessor for the recalls that created such turmoil in the organization. Our text identifies the five steps strategic control process for organization’s top managers as focus of strategic control, where executives identify the control measures the organization tends to achieve. Secondly the strategic control standards are the benchmarks. Finally, “Exerting strategic control requires that performance be measured (Step
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The recall fiasco that was to follow in the 2000s was created by the inexplicable complacency that began to plague Toyota. They were definitely responsible for the crisis, and it was preventable by following the five steps mentioned earlier to address strategic control. The benchmarks of quality and safety were not followed, as recalls related to pedals had Toyota pointing fingers with the makers of the faulty pedals, one in the US and one in Japan. The US maker, in Indiana, were the faulty pedals were found to originate, were not using the same processes for production as their Japanese counterpart, and the Japanese manufacturer had no recalled products. Management at Toyota should have been measuring their products success against previous products, and when the faulty parts were found they should have swiftly created a corrective action plan, but they pointed fingers and reacted sluggishly, giving their brand the tarnished name it had begun to deal with during the massive amount of …show more content…
Toyota was taking severe public relations hits from consumers, the media, governmental agencies and especially their competitors, so management could decide to settle out of court and hope it goes away or they can react swiftly to the allegations with their own factually based analysis. I was very surprised Akio Toyoda decided to address the accusations, but they found every issue with a Toyota, baseless or not was part of the enduring scrutiny of the recalls. In 2010, Toyota had 272 complaints of accelerator issues as compared to 74 in 2009 and 8 in 2008, so the press and other reporting entities were creating a sense of panic among the consumers. The NHTSA’s website, as it relates to Toyota has, by their own admission have, “Note: Since public release of the NHTSA and NASA reports on February 8, 2011, the agency has revised its redactions to the reports to release certain material previously deemed confidential under 49 U.S.C. § 30167. The NHTSA and NASA reports currently on this web page, which were posted April 15, 2011, replace the ones posted previously and contain the revised redactions” (NHTSA, 2011, p.1). The article goes on to address the findings by NASA that no electronic evidence could be reached, giving Toyoda the reward of handling the crisis of the recalls as efficient, at the point they enacted
The recall fiasco that was to follow in the 2000s was created by the inexplicable complacency that began to plague Toyota. They were definitely responsible for the crisis, and it was preventable by following the five steps mentioned earlier to address strategic control. The benchmarks of quality and safety were not followed, as recalls related to pedals had Toyota pointing fingers with the makers of the faulty pedals, one in the US and one in Japan. The US maker, in Indiana, were the faulty pedals were found to originate, were not using the same processes for production as their Japanese counterpart, and the Japanese manufacturer had no recalled products. Management at Toyota should have been measuring their products success against previous products, and when the faulty parts were found they should have swiftly created a corrective action plan, but they pointed fingers and reacted sluggishly, giving their brand the tarnished name it had begun to deal with during the massive amount of …show more content…
Toyota was taking severe public relations hits from consumers, the media, governmental agencies and especially their competitors, so management could decide to settle out of court and hope it goes away or they can react swiftly to the allegations with their own factually based analysis. I was very surprised Akio Toyoda decided to address the accusations, but they found every issue with a Toyota, baseless or not was part of the enduring scrutiny of the recalls. In 2010, Toyota had 272 complaints of accelerator issues as compared to 74 in 2009 and 8 in 2008, so the press and other reporting entities were creating a sense of panic among the consumers. The NHTSA’s website, as it relates to Toyota has, by their own admission have, “Note: Since public release of the NHTSA and NASA reports on February 8, 2011, the agency has revised its redactions to the reports to release certain material previously deemed confidential under 49 U.S.C. § 30167. The NHTSA and NASA reports currently on this web page, which were posted April 15, 2011, replace the ones posted previously and contain the revised redactions” (NHTSA, 2011, p.1). The article goes on to address the findings by NASA that no electronic evidence could be reached, giving Toyoda the reward of handling the crisis of the recalls as efficient, at the point they enacted