Q4:
1.0: Introduction
The issue on whether the principle of supremacy (hereinafter called ‘POS’) of European Union (EU) law where EU law takes precedence over national law still stands firmly, or it is merely a hallucination in the eyes of national courts will be tackled by looking at the Member States’ (MS) responses to European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions and the methods of ‘qualification’ to EU law’s supremacy that MS adopted alongside with the academics opinions.
2.0: EU law is supreme
It is essential for the EU legal system (being one of the biggest legal orders in the world ) to be supreme in order to ensure the uniform application and effectiveness of Community law within the MS. Though the principle of supremacy is not explicitly …show more content…
The POS continues to develop in Costa v ENEL whereby the ECJ ruled that EU law had became an ‘integral part’ of the MS’s legal system and was binding on them. Furthermore, the ECJ in Internationale Handellgesellschaf held that the POS “…cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that state or the principle of a national constitutional structure.” Not only that, the POS was given added force in Simmenthal , where the ECJ provided the applicability of the EU law regardless of the national law pre-dating or post-dating the Community law. One must be noted that though the national court has the duty to set aside a national legislation that is in conflict with EU law (Factortame (No 2) ), but this merely means national law will be dis-applied and not being invalidated. Therefore, it is submitted that the POS of EU law is not a …show more content…
Additionally, POS of EU law has been further qualified recently in R (HS2 Action Alliance) v Secretary of State for Transport . Moreover, the enactment of the European Union Act 2011, particularly s.18, has ensure that “ultimate authority remains with UK Parliament” and implicitly stated that Parliament can deliberately enact legislation that derogates from EU law and will propably be the courts’ duty to follow the Parliament’ intention (per Lord Denning in Macarthys v Smith ). All these can be seen as a limit to the
1.0: Introduction
The issue on whether the principle of supremacy (hereinafter called ‘POS’) of European Union (EU) law where EU law takes precedence over national law still stands firmly, or it is merely a hallucination in the eyes of national courts will be tackled by looking at the Member States’ (MS) responses to European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions and the methods of ‘qualification’ to EU law’s supremacy that MS adopted alongside with the academics opinions.
2.0: EU law is supreme
It is essential for the EU legal system (being one of the biggest legal orders in the world ) to be supreme in order to ensure the uniform application and effectiveness of Community law within the MS. Though the principle of supremacy is not explicitly …show more content…
The POS continues to develop in Costa v ENEL whereby the ECJ ruled that EU law had became an ‘integral part’ of the MS’s legal system and was binding on them. Furthermore, the ECJ in Internationale Handellgesellschaf held that the POS “…cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that state or the principle of a national constitutional structure.” Not only that, the POS was given added force in Simmenthal , where the ECJ provided the applicability of the EU law regardless of the national law pre-dating or post-dating the Community law. One must be noted that though the national court has the duty to set aside a national legislation that is in conflict with EU law (Factortame (No 2) ), but this merely means national law will be dis-applied and not being invalidated. Therefore, it is submitted that the POS of EU law is not a …show more content…
Additionally, POS of EU law has been further qualified recently in R (HS2 Action Alliance) v Secretary of State for Transport . Moreover, the enactment of the European Union Act 2011, particularly s.18, has ensure that “ultimate authority remains with UK Parliament” and implicitly stated that Parliament can deliberately enact legislation that derogates from EU law and will propably be the courts’ duty to follow the Parliament’ intention (per Lord Denning in Macarthys v Smith ). All these can be seen as a limit to the