Three renowned economists of the time with differing opinions were James Shotwell, Sir Andrew McFadyean, and John Maynard Keynes. Claude Campbell states in his paper, Economic Errors of the Treaty of Versailles, “Perhaps the most favorable evaluation of the economic provisions of the Treaty was that of James T. Shotwell…He took the position that only the ‘unendurable servitudes’ in the treaty were in the sections of the Reparation and the Polish Settlement and raised the question as to what part of Germany’s grievance against the peace lay in the substance of its exactions and what part in the manner of their imposition.” (3) A slightly more critical view of the economics within the treaty comes from Sir Andrew McFadyean, who served under John M. Keynes from 1917-1919 at the Treasury and was a Treasury Representative on the Paris Peace Conference from 1919-1920. (Archives Hub) McFadyean agreed with Keynes on the grounds that the treaty consisted of too harsh of reparations and agreed with Shotwell on the problems of the Polish Settlement. Largely, McFadyean stressed that the provisions themselves were not the problem, but more so on how they were executed. (Campbell, 4) One of the more critical persons of the economic provisions was that of John Maynard Keynes. He expressed is problems with the treaty in his book, …show more content…
To answer this question, it can help to investigate the economic and territorial provisions put against Germany. Claude A. Campbell states, “Depriving Germany of her resources in excess of the amount necessary to fulfill the economic demands of the victors, as was done in the disposition of the Saar and in the Polish settlement, was indefensible. The questions of punitive measures and retributive justice in these situations had no economic justification.” (163) The Allied Powers had restricted so many of the resources by taking the lands of the Polish settlement from Germany, thus taking away their ability to succeed as they did before the war. Export trade restrictions were placed upon Germany as well, making it unrealistic for Germany to be able to pay for both their export trade and other post-war financial obligations all while trying to rebuild their own economy. (Taussig, 33-57) Evidently, the treaty’s provisions were aimed at cutting down Germany’s resources along with making them pay more for their exports. The combination of Germany’s lost resources, expectancy to import more than they export, and additional export taxes illustrates that the initial provisions were not made with the intention to help restore Germany, and that is where the the provisions