In this case, the groups affected by the implementation of the two-child policy are extremely large and take up a significant portion of the Chinese population. Because the groups are so extremely large, Olson draws upon the problem of the ‘free rider.' The problem of the ‘free rider’ states that because group benefits are usually inherently shared, the individual benefit from the collective action cannot be privatized - therefore motivating individual members with common interests to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others in obtaining the collective goal. In this case, the collective goal is the implementation of the two-child policy, which will holistically benefit the masses that are involved in the advocation against the one-child policy. Olson’s theory shows that the problem of the ‘free rider’ is especially highly influential in social movements as it problematizes mobilization of the group. Therefore, collective action cannot be assumed to flow from common interests. Stemming from the problem of the ‘free rider’ Olson’s theory addresses the efficacy of the large organizational unit. Marginal contribution being minute may be since the probability of ‘making a difference’ is extremely small whereby individuals believe that their effort will not make a significant difference to the production and availability of the public good. In such a case, where there is a large organizational unit motivating the commencement of a two-child policy - monitoring the marginal contribution is difficult and near impossible whilst the marginal contribution is very likely to be
In this case, the groups affected by the implementation of the two-child policy are extremely large and take up a significant portion of the Chinese population. Because the groups are so extremely large, Olson draws upon the problem of the ‘free rider.' The problem of the ‘free rider’ states that because group benefits are usually inherently shared, the individual benefit from the collective action cannot be privatized - therefore motivating individual members with common interests to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others in obtaining the collective goal. In this case, the collective goal is the implementation of the two-child policy, which will holistically benefit the masses that are involved in the advocation against the one-child policy. Olson’s theory shows that the problem of the ‘free rider’ is especially highly influential in social movements as it problematizes mobilization of the group. Therefore, collective action cannot be assumed to flow from common interests. Stemming from the problem of the ‘free rider’ Olson’s theory addresses the efficacy of the large organizational unit. Marginal contribution being minute may be since the probability of ‘making a difference’ is extremely small whereby individuals believe that their effort will not make a significant difference to the production and availability of the public good. In such a case, where there is a large organizational unit motivating the commencement of a two-child policy - monitoring the marginal contribution is difficult and near impossible whilst the marginal contribution is very likely to be