The Code of Hammurabi, as commented on by Charles F. Horne, was a series of laws dictated by the famed Babylonian ruler Hammurabi, described as “the earliest known example of a ruler proclaiming publicly to his people an entire body of laws” (qtd. in Halsall). Claude Hermann Walter Johns notes that “in the criminal law the ruling principle was [“an eye for an eye”], where “a sort of symbolic retaliation was the punishment of the [convicted criminal],” in which as Horne analogously states, often resulted in “grim retaliatory punishments” that “[took] no note of [any] excuses or explanations”(also qtd. in Halsall). However, though “the theory of ‘an eye for an eye’ may have worked in [Hammurabi’s time]”, it is now seen as “extremely outdated” and many “progressive countries such as Israel, Australia, and all of Western Europe [moved forward] and have permanently banned all forms of capital punishment” (Campbell). In spite of 16 U.S. states consequently realizing the costly error of this inefficient and “archaic policy” and proceeding to align their respective policies on capital punishment with those in other parts of the globe, the rest of the U.S. has remained ardent in the use of this principle in …show more content…
Although numerous philosophers have attempted to reform the concept of “an eye for an eye,” with Waldron arguing “that it can be rendered plausible if interpreted to call for punishment that ‘possess[es] some or all of the characteristics that made the offense wrong,” so far it seems that most of their efforts have been largely unsuccessful (qtd. in Walen). No matter how one “spells out the wrong-making characteristics,” it appears as if the principle of “an eye for an eye” may “provide a measure either too vague to be much help [or too specific to plausible]” (Walen). The famous nineteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant fully “[supported] this measurement of punishment”, believing that “all other measurements bring into consideration elements beside strict justice” (Rauscher). While he tried to propose “what might be thought a better version” as to “[prohibit] those forms of mistreatment that could make the humanity in the [convicted person] suffering it into something abominable” (Walen), he stills struggled to grasp the fact that “as a principle, [“an eye for an eye”] grounds but does not specify the exact punishment” and “‘like for like’ is not always possible to the letter” (Rauscher). Despite all these