Firstly, God’s good nature can lead Him to desire good things, yet He may allow evil things on Earth in order to make us understand what is moral and what is immoral. Without evil then there would be no consequences to immoral actions, therefore no one would be able to distinguish between good or bad (Zacharias, 2013). Moreover, simply because good is correlated with the lack of evil does not necessarily mean good will cause nonexistence of evil. Secondly, heaven need not be a real place, proven by science, in order to posit a valid argument for the existence of God. The argument is that if Heaven exists, then it follows that all evils are justified by this eternal life. Also, a greater good that justifies evil is not required to be a good that is enjoyed in the present time; it may be a good that is to come. In conclusion, the deductive argument from evil is valid, with a logical conclusion following from the premises posed, but it is unsound in its assumptions of the nature of God – the implication of His traits. It makes a flawed link between the Omni benevolent essence of God’s being and a “necessary” elimination of evil by God. Furthermore, it fallaciously entails both a human conception of “perfect good” and a human understanding of this
Firstly, God’s good nature can lead Him to desire good things, yet He may allow evil things on Earth in order to make us understand what is moral and what is immoral. Without evil then there would be no consequences to immoral actions, therefore no one would be able to distinguish between good or bad (Zacharias, 2013). Moreover, simply because good is correlated with the lack of evil does not necessarily mean good will cause nonexistence of evil. Secondly, heaven need not be a real place, proven by science, in order to posit a valid argument for the existence of God. The argument is that if Heaven exists, then it follows that all evils are justified by this eternal life. Also, a greater good that justifies evil is not required to be a good that is enjoyed in the present time; it may be a good that is to come. In conclusion, the deductive argument from evil is valid, with a logical conclusion following from the premises posed, but it is unsound in its assumptions of the nature of God – the implication of His traits. It makes a flawed link between the Omni benevolent essence of God’s being and a “necessary” elimination of evil by God. Furthermore, it fallaciously entails both a human conception of “perfect good” and a human understanding of this