First off, we notice that they focus on their first ten years of operation as a breakthrough period of sorts. I believe it is an attempt to set the bar high for future achievement, but I fear that it may also signal a high watermark of sorts that may hearken to their glory days of industry leading performance. Next they focus …show more content…
They sold their Long John Silver’s and A&S chains in 2011 and bought a series of restaurants in China known as Little Sheep (Patton, 2011). Pizza Hut as slid in market share to independent pizzerias, but they hope to invigorate sales with a drastic menu change (Horovitz, 2014, Hynum, 2014). I wonder if Yum has completely given up on Taco Bell since they have three times the number of stores as Chipotle, but only bring in twice the revenue, and Chipotle sales more than a million dollars more per store (“The QSR 50 Mexican”, 2015). Chick-fil-A has blown KFC out of the top position in chicken sales with one third of the number of stores , but revenues at each store average 330% above KFC single store sales (“The QSR 50 Chicken”, 2014; “Top 50 Breakdown by “, 2011). This probably accounts for the opening of nearly 250 Chick-fil-A stores since 2010 whereas KFC closed more than 500 locations. On the American Customer Satisfaction Index, Yum Brands only has Pizza Hut in the top ten for fast food restaurants, trailing behind Chick-fil-A, Chipotle, Panera, and Papa John’s (Vasel, 2015). Taco Bell scores only a single ranking score below KFC, and is tied with Jack in the Box near the bottom of the …show more content…
This accounts for the 1600 new KFCs and 780 Pizza Huts in China and smaller but similar growth in India (Yum, 2011; Yum 2015). Their other goals of building brands thru marketing, innovation, and value and industry leading returns also seem to be concentrated on their international growth sector. I will have to admit that the Yum annual reports are the first that I have seen from a US owned company that feature China and India returns before domestic