i. Introduction
The case at hand is concerned with the applicability and significance of constitutional principles, namely the doctrine of joint responsibility, as well as the justiciability of the courts with regards to public interest in confidential constitutional matters.
ii. Facts
Mr Richard Crossman (“C”) was a cabinet minister from 1964 until 1970, during which he wrote a diary extensively detailing correspondence between cabinet ministers, senior civil servants of the government and the views held by the ministers in meetings; this was written to the knowledge of C’s peers, who were also aware of his intention to publish these diaries in the future. The major dispute dealt with in this case arose shortly after C’s death in 1974, …show more content…
Although the judgment appeared to be just and satisfied the government, this raised questions on why Lord Widgery underpinned constitutional conventions with common law doctrines; extending even further, how much legal effect should constitutional conventions carry. It can be argued that although technically Lord Widgery did not enforce the constitutional conventions (of confidentiality of cabinet proceedings) by refusing an injunction, he did however expand an existing common law doctrine (of confidentiality) so that some purpose of the constitutional convention could still be achieved in the future. On the other hand, some may argue that Lord Widgery ‘stretched’ the judgment given by Ungoed-Thomas J too far, and that extending principles applied in a breach of confidence in domestic matters to those of public rights was almost bizarre , criticising that it was a bold move. Some media and public lawyers may not welcome Lord Widgery’s judgment ; they may argue that extending the law of confidence to information about the government would lessen the transparency in the operation of the government to the general public, which is generally not in the interest of the public. However, such judicial discretion led to further development of the law of confidence as well as became “one of the stones of the arch of constitutional practice
The case at hand is concerned with the applicability and significance of constitutional principles, namely the doctrine of joint responsibility, as well as the justiciability of the courts with regards to public interest in confidential constitutional matters.
ii. Facts
Mr Richard Crossman (“C”) was a cabinet minister from 1964 until 1970, during which he wrote a diary extensively detailing correspondence between cabinet ministers, senior civil servants of the government and the views held by the ministers in meetings; this was written to the knowledge of C’s peers, who were also aware of his intention to publish these diaries in the future. The major dispute dealt with in this case arose shortly after C’s death in 1974, …show more content…
Although the judgment appeared to be just and satisfied the government, this raised questions on why Lord Widgery underpinned constitutional conventions with common law doctrines; extending even further, how much legal effect should constitutional conventions carry. It can be argued that although technically Lord Widgery did not enforce the constitutional conventions (of confidentiality of cabinet proceedings) by refusing an injunction, he did however expand an existing common law doctrine (of confidentiality) so that some purpose of the constitutional convention could still be achieved in the future. On the other hand, some may argue that Lord Widgery ‘stretched’ the judgment given by Ungoed-Thomas J too far, and that extending principles applied in a breach of confidence in domestic matters to those of public rights was almost bizarre , criticising that it was a bold move. Some media and public lawyers may not welcome Lord Widgery’s judgment ; they may argue that extending the law of confidence to information about the government would lessen the transparency in the operation of the government to the general public, which is generally not in the interest of the public. However, such judicial discretion led to further development of the law of confidence as well as became “one of the stones of the arch of constitutional practice