In 1945, the Enola Gay, a Boeing B-29 Super-fortress bomber, dropped an atomic bomb in Hiroshima, Japan, “killing about 70,000 people in a blinding flash of heat and radiation”, some died in an attempt to escape from the fire, some died drowning in the river, with a multitude dying years later due to radiation poising, cancer caused by the radiation as well as severe burns. This essay compares the two source documents reflecting the personal experiences of both Colonel Paul Tibbets, the pilot who dropped the bomb on the industrial city of Hiroshima and Yoshitaka Kawamoto, a school boy that survived the bomb. The two primary sources shine a light on the devastating effects of the bomb both physiologically and politically, with the Colonel Paul
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Similarly, although not American, “General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of Allied forces in Western Europe, told Stimson that the atomic bomb should not be used. Voicing his ‘grave misgivings’, he explained that Japan was ‘already defeated’: Japan was ‘at that very moment’ seeking some way to surrender with ‘a minimum loss of face’”. On the other hand, some Americans would try to argue that the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima was justified due to their brutality and the attacks on Pearl Harbour. Their actions during World Ward II generated a lack of sympathy for them from American citizens, and even before World War II it could be argued that there was some American bias and prejudice targeted at “Japanese immigrants … [who] found themselves the targets of stereotyping, discrimination, violence, and exclusion that would lead directly to the internment camps of World War II”. The lack of sympathy for Japan could also be supported by Colonel Harry F. Cunningham’s statement: “For us, THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS IN JAPAN”. The brutality of the Japanese military adds to the moral context for the dropping of the atomic bomb for the pilot whereas Yoshitaka has no context or knowledge of Japan’s effect on …show more content…
However, it can be argued that it wasn’t the United States’ intention to destroy civilians, evidential of an entry in Truman’s diary where “[he] told the Secretary of War Mr Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children” and that the “the target should be ‘a purely military one’”. Another significant discussion point that goes towards proving the Japanese had sufficient warning before the bombing to prevent maximum civilian deaths was that “in the Potsdam declaration of July 26, Truman issued an ultimatum to Japan to accept ‘unconditional surrender’ or face the ‘utter devastation of the Japanese homeland’”. The threat in the ultimatum was clear to the Japanese government yet “Premier Kantaro Suzuki rejected Truman’s final warning by declaring that it was ‘unworthy of public notice’”, resulting Stimson and American politicians to proceed to “demonstrate that the ultimatum meant ‘exactly what it said’”. Another substantial argument targeted to quash beliefs of American brutality is the dropping of the LeMay leaflets. The LeMay leaflets often “told civilians to evacuate, and sometimes encouraged them to push their leaders to surrender”, yet however, these
Similarly, although not American, “General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of Allied forces in Western Europe, told Stimson that the atomic bomb should not be used. Voicing his ‘grave misgivings’, he explained that Japan was ‘already defeated’: Japan was ‘at that very moment’ seeking some way to surrender with ‘a minimum loss of face’”. On the other hand, some Americans would try to argue that the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima was justified due to their brutality and the attacks on Pearl Harbour. Their actions during World Ward II generated a lack of sympathy for them from American citizens, and even before World War II it could be argued that there was some American bias and prejudice targeted at “Japanese immigrants … [who] found themselves the targets of stereotyping, discrimination, violence, and exclusion that would lead directly to the internment camps of World War II”. The lack of sympathy for Japan could also be supported by Colonel Harry F. Cunningham’s statement: “For us, THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS IN JAPAN”. The brutality of the Japanese military adds to the moral context for the dropping of the atomic bomb for the pilot whereas Yoshitaka has no context or knowledge of Japan’s effect on …show more content…
However, it can be argued that it wasn’t the United States’ intention to destroy civilians, evidential of an entry in Truman’s diary where “[he] told the Secretary of War Mr Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children” and that the “the target should be ‘a purely military one’”. Another significant discussion point that goes towards proving the Japanese had sufficient warning before the bombing to prevent maximum civilian deaths was that “in the Potsdam declaration of July 26, Truman issued an ultimatum to Japan to accept ‘unconditional surrender’ or face the ‘utter devastation of the Japanese homeland’”. The threat in the ultimatum was clear to the Japanese government yet “Premier Kantaro Suzuki rejected Truman’s final warning by declaring that it was ‘unworthy of public notice’”, resulting Stimson and American politicians to proceed to “demonstrate that the ultimatum meant ‘exactly what it said’”. Another substantial argument targeted to quash beliefs of American brutality is the dropping of the LeMay leaflets. The LeMay leaflets often “told civilians to evacuate, and sometimes encouraged them to push their leaders to surrender”, yet however, these