In this essay, I contend that the inherent value of human integrity supersedes the moral obligation purported by Singer. Therefore, while I believe it to be morally acceptable for one to do within one’s capabilities to avert the occurrence of something bad, provided it does not involve “sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance” (Singer, 1971), it should not the singly permissible action an agent is allowed, as Singer argues should be the case in the drowning child analogy. I am of the view that the proposed example is an imperfect model of the humanitarian dilemma we face in reality, and thus cannot be taken as proof of the universalizability of Singer’s argument, that every agent has to have such a moral obligation.
My argument …show more content…
It then follows with the deontic verdict that we ought to prevent the above from happening, provided it is within our capacity, and that any increase in humanitarian efforts on the part of an agent does not drastically decrease his standard of living. In terms of marginal utility, one should donate to aid agencies so as to prevent the suffering and death of other person, “at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one’s dependents… As much suffering as one would prevent” (Singer, 1971). He then goes on to provide epistemological justification, citing the example of a drowning child, in which one would intuitively agree that the obvious and only permissible act to do would be to wade in and save the child, at the expense of one’s clothing and footwear.
The outcome of this argument is that we willingly fall prey to Singer’s moral hostage taking, due to the illusory completeness of his theory. However, in the next section, I aim to expound on the lack of consistency and universalizability of the drowning child analogy, and rebut Singer’s view as a compromise of human …show more content…
The crux of his argument lies in our moral intuitions in his example of the drowning child. Unfortunately, such an analogy is not homologous to the humanitarian quandary that we find ourselves facing in reality.
Firstly, the drowning child example appeals mainly to an agent's compassion towards children, his sense of fatal urgency and repulsion towards death. In placing a child in the pond and not a self-sufficient adult, perhaps Singer’s purpose is to illustrate
My argument …show more content…
It then follows with the deontic verdict that we ought to prevent the above from happening, provided it is within our capacity, and that any increase in humanitarian efforts on the part of an agent does not drastically decrease his standard of living. In terms of marginal utility, one should donate to aid agencies so as to prevent the suffering and death of other person, “at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one’s dependents… As much suffering as one would prevent” (Singer, 1971). He then goes on to provide epistemological justification, citing the example of a drowning child, in which one would intuitively agree that the obvious and only permissible act to do would be to wade in and save the child, at the expense of one’s clothing and footwear.
The outcome of this argument is that we willingly fall prey to Singer’s moral hostage taking, due to the illusory completeness of his theory. However, in the next section, I aim to expound on the lack of consistency and universalizability of the drowning child analogy, and rebut Singer’s view as a compromise of human …show more content…
The crux of his argument lies in our moral intuitions in his example of the drowning child. Unfortunately, such an analogy is not homologous to the humanitarian quandary that we find ourselves facing in reality.
Firstly, the drowning child example appeals mainly to an agent's compassion towards children, his sense of fatal urgency and repulsion towards death. In placing a child in the pond and not a self-sufficient adult, perhaps Singer’s purpose is to illustrate