What Is Personal Identity?

Locke’s central thesis was that personal identity consists, not in sameness of substance, but in ‘sameness of consciousness’(Shoemaker on the Memory Theory). When something psychological like soul, memory and something immaterial etc. are assumed to account for persistence through time, which is the numerical identity between objects at different times(Seymour, Lecture 4/4), they are categorized as the non-physical accounts. In Locke’s view, consciousness was used as a synonym of memory although he did not specify the perspective i.e whether in first person experience or in the second person etc. Therefore, many scholars regard Locke as the originator of the view that a person’s identity on the time continuum consists of memories and the capacity …show more content…
This is so because Locke’s theory associates memories or consciousness of events to personal identity. Since the young man remembers his boyhood experience, he is theoretically (Shoemaker on the Memory Theory) the same person. Since the old general remembers his heroic acts in battles as a young officer, he is theoretically (Shoemaker on the Memory Theory), the same person as the young officer. However, since the old man does not remember his childhood flogging experience, he is a different person from a memory theory perspective. In reality, however, all the three people are the same person, just at different stages in the time continuum, the knowledge of past events or experiences notwithstanding. In mathematical theory and logical comparisons, with regard to transitivity law, the boy and the old general are supposed to be the same person i.e if the boy is the same person as the young army officer, and the young army officer is the same as the old general, then, transitively, the boy is the same person as the old army general. Therefore, Reid’s allegory faults Locke’s memory theory on the basis of …show more content…
Locke states categorically that personal identity is constitutes by memories that can be remembered, not those that the person does not remember currently. Indeed, there is a high likelihood that if prompted, the old general can remember the childhood flogging experience remotely. Therefore, although the old general does not remember the experience, he can remember it if his memory is triggered. In Leibniz’s law, with regard to organic cases, the material constitution, over time, does not define personal identity but the sameness of a psychology occupying a certain body is essential. Therefore, the old general and the young boy are the same person just at different points in the time continuum. Therefore, despite the differences in the physical aspects such as size, age etc, it is still the same body and Leibniz’s law effectively negates Reid’s objection of the shoe-maker theory (Shoemaker on the Memory