If the body of resistors and their ensuing diaspora is small and marginal enough, the ramifications will likely mirror those affiliated with Class A diaspora. Different from Class A diaspora, this diaspora does not reflect an effort to impose a dominant identity on others but rather a new, supra-nationalist identity. The “newness” is important as it means that the diaspora resisting this identity will maintain its networks with co-ethnics, co-religionists, and people from the same region or other affiliate group and use these networks to provide economic, material and volunteer support for resistance. If the resistance to this supranational identity within the sending state is reduced to minimal levels by either force or surrender by the population, the existing opposing diaspora will shift from active engagement within the sending state to using its host state and international mechanisms to convey its resistance. Like that of Class A diaspora, Class C diaspora will likely be highly suspicious of any efforts by the sending state to engage the diaspora. To succeed in garnering support from the diaspora for state-building and state-serving economic development, it would have to make material and symbolic overtures, and provide assurances …show more content…
The first wave of diaspora in Class D is often part of the educated, the religious or the political opposition. These individuals will likely be eager to engage in homeland politics, economics, and religious practices by identifying and working with allies within the state in an attempt to subvert the imposed supranational state. If the supranational identity remains entrenched in power and fails to provide sufficient economic and political benefits to its population, a second, larger wave of diaspora is likely to emerge. This wave will usually be composed of a younger, angrier demographic whose identity to the supranational state has waned in favor of their ethnic, religious, political, or regional