According to Wal-Mart’s corporate website, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. is a retail corporation has 11,500 stores in 28different countries (Wal-Mart Site n.d.). Walmart employs 2.3 million associates worldwide and 1.5 million associates in the Unites States alone (Wal-Mart Site n.d.). In 2004, Wal-Mart tried get approval to build two stores in the Chicago city area. Although Wal-Mart was currently in the Chicago Metropolitan area, it had no foothold in the city of Chicago itself (Baron 2010). However, Wal-Mart had previously experienced labor issues in the past with other states in the U.S. With those labor issues looming, Wal-Mart had a negative stigma when it tried to break into new markets. This was the case in Chicago in 2004 when Wal-Mart
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Should Wal-Mart give up on entering Chicago? In my opinion, Wal-Mart should not give up its interests in Chicago and continue to expand into the Chicago city area despite the arguments posed by the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), the Chicago Worker’s Rights Board, and other civic groups. Firstly, Wal-Mart had existing support through Alderwoman Emma Mitts and through Alderman Howard Brookins, Jr. Wal-Mart could leverage that relationship in order to negotiate with the Chicago Federation of Labor. The Federation had three demands for Wal-Mart that were all addressable for Wal-Mart. Further, Wal-Mart could have leveraged the fact that the new stores would allow workers that were unemployed from the closures of the Ryerson Tull steel and Helene Curtis plants to be rehired as associates of Wal-Mart. Thus allowing the community to keep its people and money in that same …show more content…
If not, should it agree to the demands of the Chicago Federation of Labor? The Chicago Federation of Labor had three demands for Wal-Mart. The first demand was for Wal-Mart to not sell groceries in Chicago. This demand would be easy for Wal-Mart. They already had a store models that only sold electronics, apparel, toys, etc., everything except for groceries. This store model is called the Walmart Discount Store (Wal-Mart Site n.d.). The second demand was for Wal-Mart to be neutral in any union organizing. This particular issue would have been a minimal risk to Wal-Mart because Alderman Howard, in the text (Baron, 2010), had identified that Target and Home Depot was not unionized even though they were within the city limits. The third demand from the Chicago Federation of Labor was to have Wal-Mart’s Chicago employees get a “living wage” (Baron, 2010). With some negotiations, Wal-Mart and the Federation should be able to come to a middle ground. Although, Wal-Mart would probably not increase the target wage for its Chicago associates, it could be argued that the $10.77 that Wal-Mart pays its associates was more than the existing pay for retailers in the
Should Wal-Mart give up on entering Chicago? In my opinion, Wal-Mart should not give up its interests in Chicago and continue to expand into the Chicago city area despite the arguments posed by the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), the Chicago Worker’s Rights Board, and other civic groups. Firstly, Wal-Mart had existing support through Alderwoman Emma Mitts and through Alderman Howard Brookins, Jr. Wal-Mart could leverage that relationship in order to negotiate with the Chicago Federation of Labor. The Federation had three demands for Wal-Mart that were all addressable for Wal-Mart. Further, Wal-Mart could have leveraged the fact that the new stores would allow workers that were unemployed from the closures of the Ryerson Tull steel and Helene Curtis plants to be rehired as associates of Wal-Mart. Thus allowing the community to keep its people and money in that same …show more content…
If not, should it agree to the demands of the Chicago Federation of Labor? The Chicago Federation of Labor had three demands for Wal-Mart. The first demand was for Wal-Mart to not sell groceries in Chicago. This demand would be easy for Wal-Mart. They already had a store models that only sold electronics, apparel, toys, etc., everything except for groceries. This store model is called the Walmart Discount Store (Wal-Mart Site n.d.). The second demand was for Wal-Mart to be neutral in any union organizing. This particular issue would have been a minimal risk to Wal-Mart because Alderman Howard, in the text (Baron, 2010), had identified that Target and Home Depot was not unionized even though they were within the city limits. The third demand from the Chicago Federation of Labor was to have Wal-Mart’s Chicago employees get a “living wage” (Baron, 2010). With some negotiations, Wal-Mart and the Federation should be able to come to a middle ground. Although, Wal-Mart would probably not increase the target wage for its Chicago associates, it could be argued that the $10.77 that Wal-Mart pays its associates was more than the existing pay for retailers in the