On August 6, 1945 at 2:45 a.m. a United States Air Force propeller-driven, four-engine Boeing B-29 aircraft lifted off from the unassuming island of Tinian in the Northern Mariana Islands. The plotted course of the aircraft that we now know infamously as the Enola Gay was due north with instructions to drop its contents. Inside, as was customary for a Boeing Super Fortress, was a bomb. However, unlike the bombs that the U.S. Air Force had scorched Japan for roughly a year with during World War II, this bomb was not filled with the standard incendiaries. Instead, this 9700 pound bomb resembling an obese metal baseball bat was packed with two masses of highly enriched uranium-235. The bomb, innocently named “Little Boy” arrived at its destination
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Eisenhower recollected from a meeting with Harry S. Truman on the subject. "I told him that since reports indicated the imminence of Japan 's collapse, I deprecated the Red Army 's engaging in that war. I foresaw certain difficulties arising out of such participation and suggested that, at the very least, we ought not to put ourselves in the position of requesting or begging for Soviet aid. It was my personal opinion that no power on earth could keep the Red Army out of that war unless victory came before they could get in."
Leo Szilard 's recollection of a 1945 meeting between James Byrnes and a group of concerned atomic scientists helps put into prospective the US Government 's feelings at the time. "The question of whether the bomb should be used in the war against Japan came up for discussion. Mr. Byrnes did not argue that it was necessary to use the bomb against the cities of Japan in order to win the war. He knew at that time, as did the rest of the Government, that Japan was essentially defeated and that the war could be won in another six months.”
In conclusion, according to the documents provided, it could be said that The United States Government 's decision to drop the atomic bomb could have been more about establishing superiority and asserting dominance throughout the world than it was about defeating Japan. Ultimately the act appeared to scare Russia which proved beneficial in many ways for the United
Eisenhower recollected from a meeting with Harry S. Truman on the subject. "I told him that since reports indicated the imminence of Japan 's collapse, I deprecated the Red Army 's engaging in that war. I foresaw certain difficulties arising out of such participation and suggested that, at the very least, we ought not to put ourselves in the position of requesting or begging for Soviet aid. It was my personal opinion that no power on earth could keep the Red Army out of that war unless victory came before they could get in."
Leo Szilard 's recollection of a 1945 meeting between James Byrnes and a group of concerned atomic scientists helps put into prospective the US Government 's feelings at the time. "The question of whether the bomb should be used in the war against Japan came up for discussion. Mr. Byrnes did not argue that it was necessary to use the bomb against the cities of Japan in order to win the war. He knew at that time, as did the rest of the Government, that Japan was essentially defeated and that the war could be won in another six months.”
In conclusion, according to the documents provided, it could be said that The United States Government 's decision to drop the atomic bomb could have been more about establishing superiority and asserting dominance throughout the world than it was about defeating Japan. Ultimately the act appeared to scare Russia which proved beneficial in many ways for the United