The contraposition between the US and USSR in the cold was prominently expressed in terms of military capabilities: how many and what type of weapons were the Soviets acquiring, what technological improvements they were working on, and how would they use them. With the technological advancement of the US collection methods, the analysis of the Soviet capabilities became fairly accurate and realistic, especially due to the fact that the large forces, weaponry and military exercises or deployments could not easily be hidden from U-2 flights or satellites. In a similar fashion, the production of the US intelligence was mainly involved in statistical activities, with the aim not only to assess the military size, but also the dimension of the Soviet economy, the budgetary expenditure and the demographic trends.
In the 1970s, the emphasis on capabilities became opposed by those policy makers, intelligence officers and intellectuals that believed that the ponderous amount of military data was not adequately supported by an analysis on the real intentions of the Soviet Union. Also, in 1976 members of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) expressed concerns for the excessive orientation of the US intelligence to capabilities, …show more content…
The politicized of Team B, and the general homogeneity in the two groups, made the results of the competitive analysis fairly predictable, with the hawkish Team B exaggerating the Soviet intentions, against the more cautious position of Team A, hence the exercise was soon abandoned. Moreover, the agreement on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the SALT II made evident that, finally known the size of Soviet capabilities, there was a urgent need of more and deeper intelligence on the intentions of
In the 1970s, the emphasis on capabilities became opposed by those policy makers, intelligence officers and intellectuals that believed that the ponderous amount of military data was not adequately supported by an analysis on the real intentions of the Soviet Union. Also, in 1976 members of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) expressed concerns for the excessive orientation of the US intelligence to capabilities, …show more content…
The politicized of Team B, and the general homogeneity in the two groups, made the results of the competitive analysis fairly predictable, with the hawkish Team B exaggerating the Soviet intentions, against the more cautious position of Team A, hence the exercise was soon abandoned. Moreover, the agreement on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the SALT II made evident that, finally known the size of Soviet capabilities, there was a urgent need of more and deeper intelligence on the intentions of