In the fall of 1805, a highly anticipated clash would bring a conclusion to the long struggle between the great powers of France and Britain off the Spanish shores of Cape Trafalgar. (Adkins, xix). This influential battle was fought to determine European naval supremacy and would promptly halt Napoleon’s forces, preventing the impending French invasion of England (Adkins, 337). Trafalgar was won through the sheer force of overwhelming manpower, superior technology and firepower ability, and excellence of British organizational strategy. Not only were the British superior in every aspect of warfare but the disobedience and disorganization of French officers, as well as the maltreatment of the Spanish allies by Napoleon, resulted in this great
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Unlike the superiority of Nelson’s unmatched strategy at sea, Napoleon repeatedly failed to grasp the fact that naval operations could not be centrally controlled and work as efficiently as on land (Adkins, 16). Napoleon was foolish, trying to use common land tactics that were “too complicated and too precise to have much chance working at sea” (Adkins, 17). Months before the battle of Trafalgar, Napoleon came to the conclusion that “he must defeat each of the European powers individually” (Adkins, 24). In addition to not thoroughly understanding the nature of the battle he was about to enter, this lack of planning on Napoleon’s part placed him in an endangered position, fighting on multiple fronts rather than one. On the front lines, French ships were not able to communicate with one another due to a lack of vision (Adkins, 303). Admiral Villeneuve was constantly signaling to allied ships, giving orders on what action to take next (Adkins, 126). In the midst of battle, he raised flags that ordered any ship not in action to join and fight (Adkins, 127). Yet, “it is quite possible that [this] crucial signal was hidden by smoke from most of the fleet” (Adkins, 127). Perhaps if Villeneuve, like Nelson, had given his fleet an order of independence, the French and Spanish may have been a worthy adversary to that of the
Unlike the superiority of Nelson’s unmatched strategy at sea, Napoleon repeatedly failed to grasp the fact that naval operations could not be centrally controlled and work as efficiently as on land (Adkins, 16). Napoleon was foolish, trying to use common land tactics that were “too complicated and too precise to have much chance working at sea” (Adkins, 17). Months before the battle of Trafalgar, Napoleon came to the conclusion that “he must defeat each of the European powers individually” (Adkins, 24). In addition to not thoroughly understanding the nature of the battle he was about to enter, this lack of planning on Napoleon’s part placed him in an endangered position, fighting on multiple fronts rather than one. On the front lines, French ships were not able to communicate with one another due to a lack of vision (Adkins, 303). Admiral Villeneuve was constantly signaling to allied ships, giving orders on what action to take next (Adkins, 126). In the midst of battle, he raised flags that ordered any ship not in action to join and fight (Adkins, 127). Yet, “it is quite possible that [this] crucial signal was hidden by smoke from most of the fleet” (Adkins, 127). Perhaps if Villeneuve, like Nelson, had given his fleet an order of independence, the French and Spanish may have been a worthy adversary to that of the