Associations, he argues, would get citizens to think about others’ issues in a more meaningful way and allows for self-governance on a smaller scale. This institution would become extremely successful because of the collaboration toward a greater idea coming from people who share the same interests and values (Lorch). To further this point, Tocqueville states, “[People in democracy] can do hardly anything by themselves, and none of them could force his fellows to help him. Therefore they all sink into a state of impotence, if they do not learn to help each other voluntarily. If men living in democratic countries had neither the right nor inclination to join together in their political ambitions, their independence would run great risks...if they failed to acquire the practice of association in their day-to-day lives, civilization itself would be in danger” (Tocqueville, 597). This furthers Tocqueville’s mindset that if the people are forced to come together to work out differences and speak their minds, they will soon feel compelled to solve problems by associations and help their neighbor on their own (592-593). However, Madison wishes to bring the people’s opinions and ideas to a larger scale, whether that be an informal type of institution in terms of associations or a more formal type such as the extended republic …show more content…
In Federalist 51, he proposes the idea of separation of powers, where each branch of government would be mostly independent. In his proposition, branches could not set each other’s salaries and no one would have too much power in assigning members to other branches (Emmett). Because he found the legislative branch a little too powerful in their lawmaking, Madison said that it would be split into two parts, the House and Senate, with different election strategies in each part. This would prevent the legislative branch from overruling the other branches and having more of a say in the flow of governmental issues. This also connects to Madison’s idea of a system of checks and balances. Such a system would make sure that each branch has a pretty equal power compared to one another, but also ensures that each branch have a system to make sure the other two are doing their jobs correctly and efficiently (Federalist, 320-321). As Madison states in Federalist 48, “An elective despotism was not the government we fought for; but one in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among the several bodies of magistracy as that no one could transcend their legal limits without being effectually checked and restrained by the others” (308). In other words, Publius doesn’t want a