(Finkelstein et al,. 2009) demonstrates an example in which the theory will not work, namely for top managers. The ambiguity of the top management task (Mintzberg, 1973) weakens managerial expectations that effort will result in performance, since exogenous factors like the economy might influence a company’s performance. Moreover the marginal value of additional compensation for top managers already earning millions of dollars may not be that great. Still, a top manager would never decline a raise (due to managerial status) – yet the additional compensation will not necessarily be motivational. We can conclude that from an expectancy theory point of view, incentives may not yield the anticipated outcomes for top managers that they might for lower. Indicating another difficulty of applying motivational
(Finkelstein et al,. 2009) demonstrates an example in which the theory will not work, namely for top managers. The ambiguity of the top management task (Mintzberg, 1973) weakens managerial expectations that effort will result in performance, since exogenous factors like the economy might influence a company’s performance. Moreover the marginal value of additional compensation for top managers already earning millions of dollars may not be that great. Still, a top manager would never decline a raise (due to managerial status) – yet the additional compensation will not necessarily be motivational. We can conclude that from an expectancy theory point of view, incentives may not yield the anticipated outcomes for top managers that they might for lower. Indicating another difficulty of applying motivational