“right to the person” that “in virtue of the violation of which they violate your right to privacy” (p. 307).
However, the problem here is that Thomson (1975) does not value privacy as a distinct right. Although, the right to privacy does not have any clear definition, she believes, there are not “any rights in the right to privacy cluster which aren't also in some other right cluster . . . [and] the right to privacy is everywhere overlapped by other rights” (p. 310). Therefore, there must be always first a violation of other rights ¬–such as the rights in the cluster of property– and then they leads to the violation of the rights in the cluster of privacy. But what about a situation when we choose to see a doctor? In this situation we waive
However, the problem here is that Thomson (1975) does not value privacy as a distinct right. Although, the right to privacy does not have any clear definition, she believes, there are not “any rights in the right to privacy cluster which aren't also in some other right cluster . . . [and] the right to privacy is everywhere overlapped by other rights” (p. 310). Therefore, there must be always first a violation of other rights ¬–such as the rights in the cluster of property– and then they leads to the violation of the rights in the cluster of privacy. But what about a situation when we choose to see a doctor? In this situation we waive