The nuclear deterrence theory is a common term used in international relations. This theory gained prominence during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence in short means to deter one state from attacking another with its nuclear weapons, that is, the state is discouraged from attacking. As a result of its extreme destructive power, nuclear weapons could deter more powerful adversaries. The nuclear deterrence theory is and has always been a theory that many states have made allusions to since the Cold War to solve foreign conflicts. In fact, it has become a doctrine. In this essay, the concepts , the theory, rogue states and major states’ views of this theory and substitutes for deterrence will be thoroughly
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Though some disputed the postulation of rationality, the fact remains that the Cold War remained cold. From the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union abjured direct military engagement, whether nuclear or otherwise, as an instrument of policy against each other. Though both constructed vast nuclear arsenals and on occasion threatened their use, they never launched nuclear weapons. But the question is, was there a cause-and-effect relationship between the presence of nuclear weapons and the absence of war? It is easy to assume that a condition of mutual nuclear deterrence accounted for the “long peace.” Though few have argued that nuclear weapons alone kept the Cold War cold, other theories including balance-of-power considerations and the elimination of great power war, it is hard to believe that nuclear weapons did not matter, that is, that the threat of instant and unacceptable nuclear retaliation had no deterrent effect. Because survival is the primal instinct of states, as it is of individuals, states are inherently …show more content…
Nonnuclear deterrence was a significant problem for the United States in the 9/11 attacks. Both Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were motivated to attack U.S. interests in part out of a low regard for America’s willingness to sustain bloody combat overseas. The apparent success of nuclear deterrence before 9/11 was conditioned by two factors: it was directed against the use of nuclear weapons by states possessing such weapons. Nuclear deterrence did not seek to prevent states from acquiring nuclear weapons; it solicited instead to prevent their use by holding hostage the enemy state’s targetable territory, leadership, industry, military forces, and cities. Nuclear deterrence moreover did not have to concern itself with threats posed by non-state actors armed with weapons of mass
Though some disputed the postulation of rationality, the fact remains that the Cold War remained cold. From the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union abjured direct military engagement, whether nuclear or otherwise, as an instrument of policy against each other. Though both constructed vast nuclear arsenals and on occasion threatened their use, they never launched nuclear weapons. But the question is, was there a cause-and-effect relationship between the presence of nuclear weapons and the absence of war? It is easy to assume that a condition of mutual nuclear deterrence accounted for the “long peace.” Though few have argued that nuclear weapons alone kept the Cold War cold, other theories including balance-of-power considerations and the elimination of great power war, it is hard to believe that nuclear weapons did not matter, that is, that the threat of instant and unacceptable nuclear retaliation had no deterrent effect. Because survival is the primal instinct of states, as it is of individuals, states are inherently …show more content…
Nonnuclear deterrence was a significant problem for the United States in the 9/11 attacks. Both Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were motivated to attack U.S. interests in part out of a low regard for America’s willingness to sustain bloody combat overseas. The apparent success of nuclear deterrence before 9/11 was conditioned by two factors: it was directed against the use of nuclear weapons by states possessing such weapons. Nuclear deterrence did not seek to prevent states from acquiring nuclear weapons; it solicited instead to prevent their use by holding hostage the enemy state’s targetable territory, leadership, industry, military forces, and cities. Nuclear deterrence moreover did not have to concern itself with threats posed by non-state actors armed with weapons of mass