Rigby’s concern stems from the “anthropocentric hubris” she ascribes to Heidegger, primarily on account of his strict distinction between animals and plants vis-à-vis human beings that exist through language. The primacy of the human subject in it’s naming of the world points, for Rigby, to a general negligence of “the diverse alterity of a flourishing more-than-human earth”: an earth that always contains “an inassimilable otherness that overwhelms our ability to understand, command and consume it.” If such a critique may seem to depart so far from Heidegger’s premises as to loose some of it’s bearing, Rigby’s demand for Romantic studies to stray from the Heideggerian matrix traditionally invoked by ecocriticism is all the more relevant. To conclude my discussion on Keats, I would, therefore, like to consider his precarious relation to nature as a possible response to this call for an unromantic Romanticism. If the previous investigation into the mind’s dwelling took aim at the primary domain of the subject, I here want to sketch the principal coordinates of its margins: namely, the site of the self’s destabilizing and effacement in the world of living
Rigby’s concern stems from the “anthropocentric hubris” she ascribes to Heidegger, primarily on account of his strict distinction between animals and plants vis-à-vis human beings that exist through language. The primacy of the human subject in it’s naming of the world points, for Rigby, to a general negligence of “the diverse alterity of a flourishing more-than-human earth”: an earth that always contains “an inassimilable otherness that overwhelms our ability to understand, command and consume it.” If such a critique may seem to depart so far from Heidegger’s premises as to loose some of it’s bearing, Rigby’s demand for Romantic studies to stray from the Heideggerian matrix traditionally invoked by ecocriticism is all the more relevant. To conclude my discussion on Keats, I would, therefore, like to consider his precarious relation to nature as a possible response to this call for an unromantic Romanticism. If the previous investigation into the mind’s dwelling took aim at the primary domain of the subject, I here want to sketch the principal coordinates of its margins: namely, the site of the self’s destabilizing and effacement in the world of living