In The Tet Offensive, written in 1996, Marc Jason Gilbert and William Head, state how historians have debated the outcome and significance of the Tet Offensive and concluded that the Communists incurred heavy losses and that Tet represented a “military defeat for the enemy.” Robert Brigham’s, “The NLF and the Tet Offensive,” argues that Tet was a costly victory for the United States and the Saigon government because the Communists came away with an “overwhelming psychological and hence political victory.” In, “The Tet Offensive,” Larry Berman claims that the objective was to attain a popular disturbance against the GVN and to show the American public that the very notion of security was null and void. While the attack itself did not surprise
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Willbanks references historian Edwin Moise comments, “It is not entirely clear to what extent this extraordinary gamble was based on hopes it could achieve its maximum goals-causing a real collapse of the Republic of Vietnam, and drawing the population of the cities into a general uprising-and to what extent it was based on a reasonable assurance of achieving more modest disruptions of the U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam(South) war effort, and of U.S. public support of the war.” Willbanks references historians James Owens and Randy Roberts in which they maintain that North Vietnamese strategist Nguyen Chi Thanh, head of the Central Office for South Vietnam and one of the primary advocates for launching the general offensive, thought that the offensive could change the entire result of the war. Willbanks also reflects on historian Ngo Vinh Long comment that the most important objective of the Tet Offensive was to force the United States to “deescalate the war in North Vietnam and to begin negotiations.” Willbanks also comments on historian Marylyn Young’s remarks that the leaders of Hanoi hoped for the collapse of the South Vietnamese government, followed by popular demands for a coalition government that would include the National Liberation Front, and the consequent withdrawal of the United
Willbanks references historian Edwin Moise comments, “It is not entirely clear to what extent this extraordinary gamble was based on hopes it could achieve its maximum goals-causing a real collapse of the Republic of Vietnam, and drawing the population of the cities into a general uprising-and to what extent it was based on a reasonable assurance of achieving more modest disruptions of the U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam(South) war effort, and of U.S. public support of the war.” Willbanks references historians James Owens and Randy Roberts in which they maintain that North Vietnamese strategist Nguyen Chi Thanh, head of the Central Office for South Vietnam and one of the primary advocates for launching the general offensive, thought that the offensive could change the entire result of the war. Willbanks also reflects on historian Ngo Vinh Long comment that the most important objective of the Tet Offensive was to force the United States to “deescalate the war in North Vietnam and to begin negotiations.” Willbanks also comments on historian Marylyn Young’s remarks that the leaders of Hanoi hoped for the collapse of the South Vietnamese government, followed by popular demands for a coalition government that would include the National Liberation Front, and the consequent withdrawal of the United