The Swedish Parliamentary And Korean Presidential System
Compared to Sweden’s relatively constrained parliamentary executive, Korea presents a presidential system in which it 's executive is on the brink of extraordinary levels of legislative power. Minor stability provided by multiparty representation in the legislature is partially diminished in both countries by the powers and limitations provided to the Korean and Swedish executives respectfully.
Sweden: The Swedish government is formed via a Speaker of the Riksdag nominated Prime Minister, and that Prime Minister 's subsequently appointed cabinet members. The Prime Minister nomination is confirmed in light of no majority opposition in the Riksdag, and for this reason is often, but not always, a representative of the majority coalition 's senior party (Currently the SDP). The Prime Minister has no set term limit, and can serve his position until he no longer has majority support in the Riksdag, this is contrasted with the Riksdag 's members four year terms. Both the Prime Minister and his Cabinet are subject to a relatively lenient vote of no confidence that requires only an simple majority (175 votes) to remove either from office. For this reason, unless under extenuating circumstances, the term limit of the Prime Minister and their cabinet are likely to coincide with …show more content…
The Prime Minister is appointed by the dominate coalition of the Riksdag, and can be subsequently disbanded by that same majority. This does not mean the Swedish Prime Minister is out of power however, strong party allegiance and an agenda setting power gives him substantial power as head of government. This role is however overshadowed when compared to the relative power invested by the Korean political structure to their head of state. Criossant, her study of delagative democratic systems, found Korea 's structural weaknesses as an void in which a “hyper-presidential-government” can be, an arguably has been, formed (Croissant, 2010). She found that when the National Assembly was dominated by the same political party as the president Tsebelis ' “absorbtion rule” on veto players essentially negates the legislatures ability to serve as a viable veto player to the President. When combined with the unbelievable decree and agenda setting powers of the President the Korean Presidential system becomes borderline non-democratic in its liberal affordance of power to the Executive (Croissant,