The strategic objectives for the United States during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom compare and contrast widely when viewed through the three strategic lenses of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. To consider the success or failure of national strategy as it pertains to warfare, the strategist must assess the nature of the conflict. Art Lykke presents an appropriate theory for national strategy that asks central questions for the national strategist based on suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. The suitability lens asks the question will the strategy attain desired goals; the lens of feasibility asks can the mission be successful with the means at hand; and the lens of acceptability asks are the “effects
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Bush’s administration successfully captured the correct strategy to attain desired goals came in the form of “National Security Directive 45.” This directive spelled out four national goals: “the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government; restoration of the security and stability of the Gulf region, and finally the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.” This document came out eighteen days after Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. National Security Directive 45 was the forerunner to the January 15, 1991 National Security Directive 54, which spelled out to the stake-holding agencies the strategic objectives in a manner in which they could effectively respond with appropriate strategic, theatre, operational, and tactical planning to accomplish the mission. As part of National Security Directive 54, President George H.W. Bush states the pertinent United Nations Security Council resolutions condemning Iraqi aggression in Kuwait and authorizing sanctions and any force necessary to remove Iraqi forces from …show more content…
“In September 2002, addressing the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush stated: “The Security Council Resolutions will be enforced…or action will be unavoidable.” This was followed by Secretary of State Colin Powell making a forceful and persuasive argument for direct intervention in Iraq due to concerns of Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction.
The new dictum of ‘joint operations’, which was first expressed on a smaller scale in Operation Desert Storm, fully came into practice by the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
“The fundamental asymmetry, however, lay(1) in the radically different capabilities of the Iraqi forces and those of the coalition in technology, training, and readiness, and (2) in Iraq’s lack of joint warfare capability against U.S. and British forces that had a degree of ‘jointness’ that had never been approached in any previous
Bush’s administration successfully captured the correct strategy to attain desired goals came in the form of “National Security Directive 45.” This directive spelled out four national goals: “the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government; restoration of the security and stability of the Gulf region, and finally the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.” This document came out eighteen days after Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. National Security Directive 45 was the forerunner to the January 15, 1991 National Security Directive 54, which spelled out to the stake-holding agencies the strategic objectives in a manner in which they could effectively respond with appropriate strategic, theatre, operational, and tactical planning to accomplish the mission. As part of National Security Directive 54, President George H.W. Bush states the pertinent United Nations Security Council resolutions condemning Iraqi aggression in Kuwait and authorizing sanctions and any force necessary to remove Iraqi forces from …show more content…
“In September 2002, addressing the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush stated: “The Security Council Resolutions will be enforced…or action will be unavoidable.” This was followed by Secretary of State Colin Powell making a forceful and persuasive argument for direct intervention in Iraq due to concerns of Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction.
The new dictum of ‘joint operations’, which was first expressed on a smaller scale in Operation Desert Storm, fully came into practice by the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
“The fundamental asymmetry, however, lay(1) in the radically different capabilities of the Iraqi forces and those of the coalition in technology, training, and readiness, and (2) in Iraq’s lack of joint warfare capability against U.S. and British forces that had a degree of ‘jointness’ that had never been approached in any previous