Nietzsche argues that through morality man was made predictable , thus in being predictable, the modern subject equipped with memory and reasoning was produced (). Therefore, man can be conditioned and disciplined through unforgettable experiences that must be burned into ones memory . An example of this is Nietzsche’s examination of the creditor-debtor relationship, as when someone takes from another, the way in which justice would be served is through punishment, thus the creditor through a form of ‘compensation’ is granted the right to exercise power over the powerless . This corresponds to the idea of cause and effect thinking, as modern subjects are now able to discipline themselves, through the internalization of violence (). Thus, unlike Rousseau, there is no accountability to a sovereign or right of rule, as the relationship between law and violence emerges as man begins to exercise discipline upon the self, through guilt (). Therefore, violence is at the heart of law, and the internalization of violence is enacted* through self-discipline and guilt. Hence, this can be regarded as an analogy of violence, as the modern subject has not be rid themselves of violence but rather violence is embedded within the heart of law and society. Thus, the modern subject exists within a literal ‘state of violence,’ as violence becomes the foundation for modern law, rights, and society and is also
Nietzsche argues that through morality man was made predictable , thus in being predictable, the modern subject equipped with memory and reasoning was produced (). Therefore, man can be conditioned and disciplined through unforgettable experiences that must be burned into ones memory . An example of this is Nietzsche’s examination of the creditor-debtor relationship, as when someone takes from another, the way in which justice would be served is through punishment, thus the creditor through a form of ‘compensation’ is granted the right to exercise power over the powerless . This corresponds to the idea of cause and effect thinking, as modern subjects are now able to discipline themselves, through the internalization of violence (). Thus, unlike Rousseau, there is no accountability to a sovereign or right of rule, as the relationship between law and violence emerges as man begins to exercise discipline upon the self, through guilt (). Therefore, violence is at the heart of law, and the internalization of violence is enacted* through self-discipline and guilt. Hence, this can be regarded as an analogy of violence, as the modern subject has not be rid themselves of violence but rather violence is embedded within the heart of law and society. Thus, the modern subject exists within a literal ‘state of violence,’ as violence becomes the foundation for modern law, rights, and society and is also