In the continuation in his writing Polenberg illustrates how “many constraints that had hobbled Roosevelt dissolved once Congress declared war. Controls were no longer as politically inexpedient or the needs to placate various interests quite as important.” Roosevelt no longer needed to balance the appeasement of his constituents with the preparations for war, for they were no longer mutually exclusive. American no longer feared the unrestrained growth of federal oversight, but worried about the government being substantially prepared for the necessities of war. Though many American before 1941, had wished dearly to stay out of the hostilities, once they were involved in the war, they wanted to make sure they were able to strike back with unquestionable
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For many, this was a reaction to the apparent failure isolation tactics had in keeping the country out of another European war. In many ways, this was a shift to the ideal that the best defense going forward would be a good offense. Though the American government did have a period of swift demobilization in the second half of the 1940s, it did not return the military back to the figures of pre-war spending. This created a new norm for the defense spending in the United States. This can be attested two specific reasons, the change from isolationism to intervention politics, and the escalation of tensions at the beginning of the Cold War. Though the United States did have a downward trend of demobilization following the end of WWII, it remained higher than the 1930 numbers. An argument can be made that this principally relates to the United States involvement in another war. This was possibly before the last one ended, with the escalation of tensions between the USSR beginning before the 1945 peace treaties. Perhaps, the American people did not want to be caught unprepared again, and in turn they did not fall quickly back into the isolationism and general feeling of pacifism that was seen at the end of The Great
For many, this was a reaction to the apparent failure isolation tactics had in keeping the country out of another European war. In many ways, this was a shift to the ideal that the best defense going forward would be a good offense. Though the American government did have a period of swift demobilization in the second half of the 1940s, it did not return the military back to the figures of pre-war spending. This created a new norm for the defense spending in the United States. This can be attested two specific reasons, the change from isolationism to intervention politics, and the escalation of tensions at the beginning of the Cold War. Though the United States did have a downward trend of demobilization following the end of WWII, it remained higher than the 1930 numbers. An argument can be made that this principally relates to the United States involvement in another war. This was possibly before the last one ended, with the escalation of tensions between the USSR beginning before the 1945 peace treaties. Perhaps, the American people did not want to be caught unprepared again, and in turn they did not fall quickly back into the isolationism and general feeling of pacifism that was seen at the end of The Great