The means by which a litigant may challenge a foreclosure become increasingly limited after a sale has occurred. Indeed, “[a]fter [a foreclosure] sale, the borrower is ordinarily limited to raising procedural irregularities in the conduct of the sale.” Thomas v. Nadel, 427 Md. 441, 442-43 (2012) (holding that a trial court may sustain “exceptions to the foreclosure sale on the ground that the deed of trust securing the consolidation loan was invalid.”). Procedural irregularities that may be raised via post-sale exceptions are generally limited to issues “such as the advertisement of sale was insufficient or misdescribed the property, the creditor committed a fraud by preventing someone from bidding or by chilling the bidding, challenging
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To be sure, Sucklal makes numerous cavalier allegations of fraud throughout her brief. Notwithstanding the fact that Sucklal’s allegations fall woefully short of making a prima facie showing of fraud, see Spangler v. Sprosty Bag Co., 183 Md. 166, 173 (1944) (“[One] seeking any relief on the ground of fraud must distinctly state the particular facts and circumstances constituting the fraud . . . . General charges of fraud or that acts were fraudulently committed are of no avail . . . .”), the fraud Sucklal alleges is unrelated to the circumstances that gave rise to the debt-creating instrument. Indeed, Sucklal admits so much in her brief when she represents that “[o]n January 20th, 2006, the Appellant obtained a loan . . . .” Rather, Sucklal claims the transactions between the original lender and the subsequent assignees were fraudulent. These claims are similar to the ones rejected by the Court of Appeals in Thomas, supra, 427 Md. at 454 (holding that general allegations of fraud unrelated to debt-creating instrument are insufficient to fit within “the ‘distinct question’ left open in Bates[, supra, 417 Md. 309].”). According, Sucklal’s allegations of fraud do not bring her grievances within the scope of matters that can be considered via post-sale exceptions under Md. Rule
To be sure, Sucklal makes numerous cavalier allegations of fraud throughout her brief. Notwithstanding the fact that Sucklal’s allegations fall woefully short of making a prima facie showing of fraud, see Spangler v. Sprosty Bag Co., 183 Md. 166, 173 (1944) (“[One] seeking any relief on the ground of fraud must distinctly state the particular facts and circumstances constituting the fraud . . . . General charges of fraud or that acts were fraudulently committed are of no avail . . . .”), the fraud Sucklal alleges is unrelated to the circumstances that gave rise to the debt-creating instrument. Indeed, Sucklal admits so much in her brief when she represents that “[o]n January 20th, 2006, the Appellant obtained a loan . . . .” Rather, Sucklal claims the transactions between the original lender and the subsequent assignees were fraudulent. These claims are similar to the ones rejected by the Court of Appeals in Thomas, supra, 427 Md. at 454 (holding that general allegations of fraud unrelated to debt-creating instrument are insufficient to fit within “the ‘distinct question’ left open in Bates[, supra, 417 Md. 309].”). According, Sucklal’s allegations of fraud do not bring her grievances within the scope of matters that can be considered via post-sale exceptions under Md. Rule