June 28th 1919, the Treaty of Versailles was signed at Versailles Palace. After months of negotiating since November 1918, there would finally be of a peace settlement between the participating countries of World War One. The post war views from the politicians often known as the ‘The Big Three’ (Lloyd George, Wilson, and Clemenceau) varied drastically on how Germany should be punished. French Prime minister Georges Clemenceau on the one hand stated that the war was the ‘greatest crime against humanity and the freedom of peoples that any nation, calling itself civilised, has ever consciously committed.’ Many people agreed with Clemenceau, that Germany must suffer as France had. Zara Steiner agreed, arguing that France’s adult population suffered
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Many would argue that the idea of a ‘Carthaginian Peace’ argued by Keynes early in the 20th century, is no longer a valid idea. Steiner for one, argues that this idea ‘needs to be abandoned.’ Additionally, the release of government papers in the 1950s and 1960s turned the tides for many historians as this new evidence provided much more valuable information on the subject. With many notable historian’s arguments coming from the last few decades, Murray’s piece is one of the most recent in the historiography. Murray focuses on similar arguments to historians such as; Rohan Butler in ‘New Cambridge Modern History’; A.J.P Taylor in ‘The Origins of the Second World War’; and Sally Marks in ‘Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921’. All of these historians stated somewhat that Germany deliberately never accepted the treaty, and that Germany was still left as a strong nation after the treaty was signed. On a side note, if you are looking for an equally factual piece of writing but with a more balanced outlook regarding the aftermath of World War One, then look toward ‘Peacemaking after World War I’ by Alan Sharp, in which Sharp notes many further issues that Murray does not account …show more content…
Rather, that the treaty had a limited effect on Germany. Prior to arguing his point, Murray once again explains the context of the situation. This allows the reader to understand Murray’s argument while not having to read into much wider details from other areas of knowledge. Murray emphasises firstly that the failed cooperation between the leaders, especially the ‘Big Three’ meant that the treaty never progressed far. He shows that while Wilson and Lloyd George wanted the best economic outcome for Europe, Clemenceau wanted strong reparations payments from Germany. Additionally Murray shows that Wilson had the wrong idea of Europe at the time, as he thought the diplomacy between many nationalities and economies in Europe would be a simple situation. Murray once again provides the reader with a thorough use of primary and secondary material to support his reasoning. For example, quotes from Winston Churchill and Andre Tardieu show how war impacted France. Tardieu states ‘The war cost us 150 billions of francs.’ In showing this first-hand information, it makes the argument much more persuasive. Additionally, historians Margaret MacMillan and Harold Nicolson help sum up Murray’s argument towards the failed cooperation of the leaders. Murray is confident in showing that the treaty never progressed far enough. We can see the importance of the Treaty of Versailles to Murray’s argument as
Many would argue that the idea of a ‘Carthaginian Peace’ argued by Keynes early in the 20th century, is no longer a valid idea. Steiner for one, argues that this idea ‘needs to be abandoned.’ Additionally, the release of government papers in the 1950s and 1960s turned the tides for many historians as this new evidence provided much more valuable information on the subject. With many notable historian’s arguments coming from the last few decades, Murray’s piece is one of the most recent in the historiography. Murray focuses on similar arguments to historians such as; Rohan Butler in ‘New Cambridge Modern History’; A.J.P Taylor in ‘The Origins of the Second World War’; and Sally Marks in ‘Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921’. All of these historians stated somewhat that Germany deliberately never accepted the treaty, and that Germany was still left as a strong nation after the treaty was signed. On a side note, if you are looking for an equally factual piece of writing but with a more balanced outlook regarding the aftermath of World War One, then look toward ‘Peacemaking after World War I’ by Alan Sharp, in which Sharp notes many further issues that Murray does not account …show more content…
Rather, that the treaty had a limited effect on Germany. Prior to arguing his point, Murray once again explains the context of the situation. This allows the reader to understand Murray’s argument while not having to read into much wider details from other areas of knowledge. Murray emphasises firstly that the failed cooperation between the leaders, especially the ‘Big Three’ meant that the treaty never progressed far. He shows that while Wilson and Lloyd George wanted the best economic outcome for Europe, Clemenceau wanted strong reparations payments from Germany. Additionally Murray shows that Wilson had the wrong idea of Europe at the time, as he thought the diplomacy between many nationalities and economies in Europe would be a simple situation. Murray once again provides the reader with a thorough use of primary and secondary material to support his reasoning. For example, quotes from Winston Churchill and Andre Tardieu show how war impacted France. Tardieu states ‘The war cost us 150 billions of francs.’ In showing this first-hand information, it makes the argument much more persuasive. Additionally, historians Margaret MacMillan and Harold Nicolson help sum up Murray’s argument towards the failed cooperation of the leaders. Murray is confident in showing that the treaty never progressed far enough. We can see the importance of the Treaty of Versailles to Murray’s argument as