The 19th Century Prussian General, Carl Von Clausewitz captured many of his insights in the book, On War. From initial combat at the age of thirteen to chief of staff of the Prussian Army, Clausewitz developed his thoughts of war based on a variety of military experience. Two of Clausewitz’s tenets seem to stand out as profound and useful, and remarkably still relevant to the modern planner. Primacy of policy helps a planner avoid a strategy policy mismatch by aligning political and military objectives, and the calculus of effort can determine what kind of war they will be fighting based on the value of the object in view. Both insights require examination to illustrate their continued applicability. The first insight, primacy of policy, states, “War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.” Clausewitz understood the entity of the nation state as the focal point of power. A state’s government establishes policies to maintain national interests. If a political disagreement involves a vital national interest, capitulation may result in damage to the state. An impasse of this sort could trigger the continuation of the political conversation with the use of military force. When a state chooses to employ the military element of national power, it does so for specific political objectives that typically support national interests. Policy makers collaborate with military planners to turn political objectives into military objectives and strategy. Primacy of policy dictates that state sanctioned violence achieves a political objective. Political and military leaders must maintain an ongoing dialogue on how well the military strategy is achieving political objectives. In the current fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), United States (U.S.) political objectives include the destruction of ISIS and the removal of ISIS as a threat to Syria. U.S. constraints include the following: No boots on the ground in Syria, No direct U.S. combat, Minimal collateral damage, and Leading a coalition of neighboring states of like mind. Unfortunately, neighboring states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates choose not to employ their military forces in support of this effort; stating the people in Syria must handle it themselves. Further, even if they were willing to send troops, Iraq has denied them the ability to assist. The inability of U.S. military strategy to accomplish the political objectives due to the given constraints has created a strategy policy mismatch. How does the military planner navigate this problem? In this particular case, the U.S. military planners must clearly communicate the shortfall to political leadership. Further, it is incumbent on planners to provide options for realigning military strategy with political objectives. This could mean vertical escalation of the conflict and may include the request for additional manpower, increased funding, or approval for the escalation of force. The Vietnam War clearly shows that a strategy policy mismatch can remain unresolved for a long period. However, the 1991 Gulf
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If his insights are still relevant today, they must withstand criticism. One critique from Martin Van Creveld discounts Clausewitz’s primacy of policy and claims that war is not the continuation of politics but rather, “a social activity resting upon some kind of organization.” He believes that a person has no “interest” in war because there is nothing gained in death, and further that individual interests often run counter to the interests of a group. Van Creveld approaches his opinion on war with the understanding that it is not a rational experience. This approach runs counter to Clausewitz who believed that war was a rational experience. Van Creveld’s argument rings hollow when it attempts to separate individual aspirations from those of the state. People align themselves in societies, the vast majority of which are nation-states. Regardless the form of government, long-term solvency of the state hinges on placating the interests of the population. Further, an existential threat to a state directly affects the citizen’s wellbeing, and a threat of this magnitude often causes peripheral angst with the state to fade. In this case, a person has interest in not dying, thus willing to go to war. War in fact is rational, and the value of the object in view most clearly illustrates Clausewitz’s rational view. The value of the political object does determine the cost the state is willing to pay. Clausewitz’s view remains valid so long as the conduct of war is a human
If his insights are still relevant today, they must withstand criticism. One critique from Martin Van Creveld discounts Clausewitz’s primacy of policy and claims that war is not the continuation of politics but rather, “a social activity resting upon some kind of organization.” He believes that a person has no “interest” in war because there is nothing gained in death, and further that individual interests often run counter to the interests of a group. Van Creveld approaches his opinion on war with the understanding that it is not a rational experience. This approach runs counter to Clausewitz who believed that war was a rational experience. Van Creveld’s argument rings hollow when it attempts to separate individual aspirations from those of the state. People align themselves in societies, the vast majority of which are nation-states. Regardless the form of government, long-term solvency of the state hinges on placating the interests of the population. Further, an existential threat to a state directly affects the citizen’s wellbeing, and a threat of this magnitude often causes peripheral angst with the state to fade. In this case, a person has interest in not dying, thus willing to go to war. War in fact is rational, and the value of the object in view most clearly illustrates Clausewitz’s rational view. The value of the political object does determine the cost the state is willing to pay. Clausewitz’s view remains valid so long as the conduct of war is a human