Andrew Williams, in his paper, Incentives, Inequality and Publicity, takes to task Cohen’s analysis of Rawls’ remarks concerning what the basic structure of society consists in. Drawing on a close examination of Rawls’ comments on the subject, Williams’ posits a characterisation that pushes to the fore the idea of publicity. The upshot of William’s analysis is that Cohen’s attempt to broaden the definition of the basic structure to capture individual choices, and in so doing identify society possessing an egalitarian ethos as a demand of justice, fails because it is not consistent with Rawls’ publicity requirements. The difference principle, Williams maintains, “is inherently restricted” and “applies only to a society's fundamental social,
…show more content…
To do this, Williams, argues, “we need to establish whether an individual of above average income has discharged her distributive duties, we need, inter alia, to check whether her additional income compensates for her special labor burdens or is legitimized by an agent-centered prerogative”. The key problem is that this is too informationally demanding to establish, since it “ is extremely unlikely that individuals could obtain reliable information about each others' relative levels of job satisfaction, the extent to which their past decisions render them responsible for inequalities in those levels, and the appropriate amount of financial compensation for any remaining unchosen disadvantages ”. Ultimately, demand of occupational compensation “resists institutionalisation for epistemic reasons”. Further, even if these epistemic reasons could be established, it is not at all clear a what point and under what conditions it becomes acceptable to allow agent-centred prerogatives to trump the egalitarian distribution. The crux of Williams argument, then, is that individual choices prescribed by a wide ethos are ambiguous and are therefore difficult to characterise by appealing to public standards. Williams
To do this, Williams, argues, “we need to establish whether an individual of above average income has discharged her distributive duties, we need, inter alia, to check whether her additional income compensates for her special labor burdens or is legitimized by an agent-centered prerogative”. The key problem is that this is too informationally demanding to establish, since it “ is extremely unlikely that individuals could obtain reliable information about each others' relative levels of job satisfaction, the extent to which their past decisions render them responsible for inequalities in those levels, and the appropriate amount of financial compensation for any remaining unchosen disadvantages ”. Ultimately, demand of occupational compensation “resists institutionalisation for epistemic reasons”. Further, even if these epistemic reasons could be established, it is not at all clear a what point and under what conditions it becomes acceptable to allow agent-centred prerogatives to trump the egalitarian distribution. The crux of Williams argument, then, is that individual choices prescribed by a wide ethos are ambiguous and are therefore difficult to characterise by appealing to public standards. Williams