A relatively small area within Russia, Chechnya lies in the southernmost part of Eastern Europe within the North Caucasus, a region with a variety of nationalities and languages that has repeatedly voiced discontent with central governments in Moscow. Given the low number of Russians in the region (less than 2% in the 2010 census), high opposition to federal rule, and rise of Islamic radicalism within the republic, it is puzzling as to why Russia has had extensive military intervention in Chechnya as to deny its secession. Why was Russia so adamant upon refusing Chechen independence? In this essay, I will try to identify the foremost reason for this intervention, primarily in regards to the First and Second Chechen War. Scholars have disputing
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He claims that “public order in Chechnya broke down almost completely during the first war in the mid-1990s, and it has never been re-established in any meaningful way.” (Kramer, 210). The government of Maskhadov soon came under growing pressure from radical groups, and imposed Sharia law in 1999, a move that fortified and encouraged the extremists. This was followed by a wave of bombings within Russia in the summer of 1999 that killed over 300, and wounded more than 2,000. The blame was quickly placed upon Chechnya, and Russia was quick to mobilize against the guerilla fighters and the Chechen government. With the safety of Russian citizens at stake, Putin gained widespread popularity with his decision to invade Chechnya. It was with great support from the general population and the elites that Russia mobilized against Chechnya a final time, a decision they said was made due to increasing casualties from terrorism. The message of the invasion was broadcast clearly by Russian leadership; the safety of the Russian population was at stake. This was a shift from the first conflict, when the retention of Chechnya was foregrounded by separatists instead of religious extremists. Kramer argues that it was with this intention to protect the Russian people and gain popular support that Putin decided to mobilize a second time against Chechnya, this time to regain control of the area completely. To deny its secession was secondary to overthrowing the government and remove the terrorist threat from the region. Therefore, Cornell and Kramer diverge in their analysis of the onset of the conflict, in that Cornell views Russia 's incentives as economic, whereas Kramer views the conflict as a diversionary intervention intended to increase Putin 's popularity at
He claims that “public order in Chechnya broke down almost completely during the first war in the mid-1990s, and it has never been re-established in any meaningful way.” (Kramer, 210). The government of Maskhadov soon came under growing pressure from radical groups, and imposed Sharia law in 1999, a move that fortified and encouraged the extremists. This was followed by a wave of bombings within Russia in the summer of 1999 that killed over 300, and wounded more than 2,000. The blame was quickly placed upon Chechnya, and Russia was quick to mobilize against the guerilla fighters and the Chechen government. With the safety of Russian citizens at stake, Putin gained widespread popularity with his decision to invade Chechnya. It was with great support from the general population and the elites that Russia mobilized against Chechnya a final time, a decision they said was made due to increasing casualties from terrorism. The message of the invasion was broadcast clearly by Russian leadership; the safety of the Russian population was at stake. This was a shift from the first conflict, when the retention of Chechnya was foregrounded by separatists instead of religious extremists. Kramer argues that it was with this intention to protect the Russian people and gain popular support that Putin decided to mobilize a second time against Chechnya, this time to regain control of the area completely. To deny its secession was secondary to overthrowing the government and remove the terrorist threat from the region. Therefore, Cornell and Kramer diverge in their analysis of the onset of the conflict, in that Cornell views Russia 's incentives as economic, whereas Kramer views the conflict as a diversionary intervention intended to increase Putin 's popularity at