In 2010, China surpassed Japan as the world 's second-largest economy. One consequence of this event relates to its significance for the two countries ' competition for global and regional status. Over the last four decades, their trajectories have presented an interesting paradox. As an economic powerhouse, Japan has been considered a global power by the rest of the international community and by other major powers. Yet, within East Asia, Japan has not been attributed regional power status by its own neighbors (Cline et al. 2011). Conversely, for several decades East Asian states have considered China to be the most relevant regional power, while the international community has struggled to attribute her global major power status. China
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Major powers have been the object of constant interest, yet scholarly attention to their status—separate from their capabilities—has followed a cyclical pattern. The salience of major power status was recognized as early as the Melian debates (Thucydides 1951:331), resuscitated systematically by Galtung’s (1964) classic work, and followed by a short explosion of scholarship (e.g., East 1972; Gilpin 1981; Midlarsky 1975; Wallace 1971; 1973). However, status considerations receded again as empirical models narrowed their foci on more measurable observations involved with the changing capabilities between major …show more content…
Why focus on major powers’ status and status inconsistencies rather than simply on their material strength? As noted above, there is substantial empirical evidence that the status of major powers matters—in addition to their capabilities—for a variety of interstate behaviors. We summarize below the theoretical reasons we believe are behind these empirical relationships.
Much of the extant literature has treated status attribution as a unidirectional process through which an unspecified number of countries recognize that a few states occupy a special position in the international system. We argue, instead, that the process of major power status attribution is bidirectional and three-pronged. It is bi-directional because major power status is not likely conferred on some states if they do not actively seek it. It is three-pronged because it depends on the convergence of three forms of attribution: (a) self-ascription; (2) attribution by the international community; and (3) attribution by existing major
Major powers have been the object of constant interest, yet scholarly attention to their status—separate from their capabilities—has followed a cyclical pattern. The salience of major power status was recognized as early as the Melian debates (Thucydides 1951:331), resuscitated systematically by Galtung’s (1964) classic work, and followed by a short explosion of scholarship (e.g., East 1972; Gilpin 1981; Midlarsky 1975; Wallace 1971; 1973). However, status considerations receded again as empirical models narrowed their foci on more measurable observations involved with the changing capabilities between major …show more content…
Why focus on major powers’ status and status inconsistencies rather than simply on their material strength? As noted above, there is substantial empirical evidence that the status of major powers matters—in addition to their capabilities—for a variety of interstate behaviors. We summarize below the theoretical reasons we believe are behind these empirical relationships.
Much of the extant literature has treated status attribution as a unidirectional process through which an unspecified number of countries recognize that a few states occupy a special position in the international system. We argue, instead, that the process of major power status attribution is bidirectional and three-pronged. It is bi-directional because major power status is not likely conferred on some states if they do not actively seek it. It is three-pronged because it depends on the convergence of three forms of attribution: (a) self-ascription; (2) attribution by the international community; and (3) attribution by existing major