Alliance Systems: Post-World War Analysis

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Alliance systems have long been a theory on the cause of war, or an explanation for action taken both before and during wars. The theory proposes that alliances cause war in a few different ways, mainly through creating a security dilemma, and creating the opportunity for buck-passing and entrapment. These are the main ways in which an alliance can increase the likelihood of war. Throughout this portion of the essay I will begin by explaining the prevalence of alliances in the post-World War II era as well as how ideologies affected these alliances. After the general overview I will then discuss the specific alliances in the Korean War, mainly on the Communist side, and how this complex alliance system forced the Chinese intervention into …show more content…
There was the Soviet Bloc, which later, after the Korean War, solidified into the Warsaw pact, The U.S. led NATO, and also a group of non-aligned states. Intermixed with these huge alliances were other smaller ones mainly between the two superpowers and other smaller states which they themselves have propped up and supported, North and South Korea both fall into this last category. It was in these smaller propped up states that the majority, if not all, of cold war conflicts flared up. Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Korea are all examples of smaller alliances dragging the two superpowers into major wars that often lasted many years. China was an interesting case because, it started as a smaller non-major alliance, but after the revolution, it started to become a power in its own right which added another layer of difficulty in the Alliance system. These alliance systems, both large and small were used as a strategy to counter the moves of the other major superpower in every theatre of the world. The Soviet-Korean and Soviet-Chinese alliances will be the focus later in the paragraph as it is argued that these are what caused the war, and caused the Soviet push for Chinese …show more content…
The argument could be made that the Soviet Union felt a deep attachment to the North Korean communists, and their mutual quest for a world dominated by Communism, but this is a stretch. The Soviet Union had been around for a while at this point, and its actions showed it was more worried about self-preservation, a protective buffer, and countering U.S. supremacy than spreading Communism for Communism’s sake. The Chinese on the other hand had just recently finished a revolution in which they beat back the nationalists forcing them into Taiwan, and Communism finally ruled all of mainland China. This revolution was still invigorated by a true unadulterated revolutionary spirit. “Other scholars place more emphasis on the role of ‘‘ideology.’’ While acknowledging Mao’s reluctance to intervene, they emphasize the inner logic of Mao’s ‘‘continuing revolution,’’ including communist internationalist ideology and national security concerns. Beijing, they argue, viewed China’s national interest via a Leninist prism, which led Mao and his associates in Moscow and Pyongyang to believe that war with the US imperialists was inevitable.” (Mao’s, 270). The reason China intervened, could have been related to its belief in continuing the spread of Communism by allying with those who support it abroad. This is similar some

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