Figure 4: The Historical Processes of Competing Interests in International Relations Source: Social Forces, States and World Orders (Cox, 1981: 138).
Figure four indicates that social forces, forms of state and world orders are interdependent in the completing interests in international relations. Social forces form the base of the ABSM, and the ideologies are essential to the deliberation process in democratic practises. The form of state represents the political institutions and material capabilities in a society. The world order represents the institutions which govern states or a wider geographical area. When considered in relation to one another, Cox suggests that each of these processes can better seen to be ‘containing, as well …show more content…
For Gramsci and Cox, Western Europe can be described in terms of Gramsci’s ‘War of Position’ as, in theory civil society had an assumed stake in the polity and therefore have the power to resist the state (Gramsci in Cox, 1981). In contrast, the Soviet Union after the 1917 Russian Revolution represents a ‘War of Movement’, as this was a war where there was no strong organisation of civil society to resist the state apparatus (Gramsci in Cox, 1981). The reason why there was no strong organisation to resist the state is due to the lack of material capabilities of the state. However, the lack of resources was due in part because as state resources (such as food) were extracted from the countryside, and given to industrial workers in the cities to contribute to fighting a war with the United States (Cox: 1981). Then, the problem posed here is that a class of ‘organic intellectuals’ cannot thrive in society which is regulated by the state which does not provide them with the basic material resources. This is a case dissimilar to South Korea, where state regulation over the economy worked in the favour of society and the economy. Then, in theory, those with control of material resources have the ability to either underpin or limit change. This constitutes the fundamental paradox of liberal democracy; and thus the very grounds on …show more content…
Democracies claimed to give individuals rights through the dissemination of power in the global world system. Yet in the very same way in which those rights are constituted – through property ownership, political accountability transparency, and ethical ideologies – the global world system undermines the values it seeks to uphold. This occurs through a combination of the distribution of power and material capabilities of actors. The fundamental paradox of democracy and ‘good governance’ as a way of fighting corruption is that we cannot have perfect representation of interests and perfect economic freedom simultaneously. Where state power becomes a threat to economic development, it becomes corruption. And vice versa, economic development can be seen as a threat to the state, but it is up to the state to create tax systems and limit the process of unfettered growth. This is, however, provided that the state or institutions are not subject to the same types of political capture and rent seeking on a larger scale. Furthermore, this mapping of governance and corruption cannot occur in a country unless it has the material capability to do
Figure four indicates that social forces, forms of state and world orders are interdependent in the completing interests in international relations. Social forces form the base of the ABSM, and the ideologies are essential to the deliberation process in democratic practises. The form of state represents the political institutions and material capabilities in a society. The world order represents the institutions which govern states or a wider geographical area. When considered in relation to one another, Cox suggests that each of these processes can better seen to be ‘containing, as well …show more content…
For Gramsci and Cox, Western Europe can be described in terms of Gramsci’s ‘War of Position’ as, in theory civil society had an assumed stake in the polity and therefore have the power to resist the state (Gramsci in Cox, 1981). In contrast, the Soviet Union after the 1917 Russian Revolution represents a ‘War of Movement’, as this was a war where there was no strong organisation of civil society to resist the state apparatus (Gramsci in Cox, 1981). The reason why there was no strong organisation to resist the state is due to the lack of material capabilities of the state. However, the lack of resources was due in part because as state resources (such as food) were extracted from the countryside, and given to industrial workers in the cities to contribute to fighting a war with the United States (Cox: 1981). Then, the problem posed here is that a class of ‘organic intellectuals’ cannot thrive in society which is regulated by the state which does not provide them with the basic material resources. This is a case dissimilar to South Korea, where state regulation over the economy worked in the favour of society and the economy. Then, in theory, those with control of material resources have the ability to either underpin or limit change. This constitutes the fundamental paradox of liberal democracy; and thus the very grounds on …show more content…
Democracies claimed to give individuals rights through the dissemination of power in the global world system. Yet in the very same way in which those rights are constituted – through property ownership, political accountability transparency, and ethical ideologies – the global world system undermines the values it seeks to uphold. This occurs through a combination of the distribution of power and material capabilities of actors. The fundamental paradox of democracy and ‘good governance’ as a way of fighting corruption is that we cannot have perfect representation of interests and perfect economic freedom simultaneously. Where state power becomes a threat to economic development, it becomes corruption. And vice versa, economic development can be seen as a threat to the state, but it is up to the state to create tax systems and limit the process of unfettered growth. This is, however, provided that the state or institutions are not subject to the same types of political capture and rent seeking on a larger scale. Furthermore, this mapping of governance and corruption cannot occur in a country unless it has the material capability to do