The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been around for over a century. There have been multiple ceasefires and treaties. This paper will focus on the Good Friday Agreement signed in 1998 and why after decades of fighting the Provisional IRA came to agree finally to a peace treaty. Though it may seem as if these peace talks hold no relevance to the majority of people, it could, in fact, be a great insight into how to deal with armed aggressors within a country. This is a problem that countries all over the world face; Syria, Africa, even Spain, all countries with armed groups within their borders that want independence. Using the Good Friday Agreements people could glean insight into how to talk to these separatist groups and come to a peaceful,
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It gave the Irish government an advisory role in the affairs of Northern Ireland but besides that had no real power to it. Though it was passed it was essentially a failure in its primary goal; to foster peace and reconciliation between the two parties. The Sinn Fein party, the “political wing” of the IRA was vehemently opposed to the agreement. Unfortunately, the treaty also alienated the unionist. Only two parties in Northern Ireland actually supported the treaty. This ordeal led to the IRA adopting a new strategy, “the Armalite and the ballot box.” This strategy focused on the continuation of the IRA’s armed conflict bit with the addition of Sinn Fein contesting the elections in Northern Ireland and being more vocal in the political …show more content…
One argument from Niall O Dochartaigh, a professor at the University of Galway, is that the resolution of the conflict can be traced back to the relationship that was fostered over the two decades of negotiations, from the failed Anglo-Irish Agreement to the Good Friday Agreement. Doctor Dochartaigh also says that despite the vast gap between the two groups, the Provisional leadership, and the British State, in terms of resources, democratic mandate and international legitimacy they both claimed to a monopoly on the legit use of violence. He finished by saying that the reconciliation of the two competing groups
It gave the Irish government an advisory role in the affairs of Northern Ireland but besides that had no real power to it. Though it was passed it was essentially a failure in its primary goal; to foster peace and reconciliation between the two parties. The Sinn Fein party, the “political wing” of the IRA was vehemently opposed to the agreement. Unfortunately, the treaty also alienated the unionist. Only two parties in Northern Ireland actually supported the treaty. This ordeal led to the IRA adopting a new strategy, “the Armalite and the ballot box.” This strategy focused on the continuation of the IRA’s armed conflict bit with the addition of Sinn Fein contesting the elections in Northern Ireland and being more vocal in the political …show more content…
One argument from Niall O Dochartaigh, a professor at the University of Galway, is that the resolution of the conflict can be traced back to the relationship that was fostered over the two decades of negotiations, from the failed Anglo-Irish Agreement to the Good Friday Agreement. Doctor Dochartaigh also says that despite the vast gap between the two groups, the Provisional leadership, and the British State, in terms of resources, democratic mandate and international legitimacy they both claimed to a monopoly on the legit use of violence. He finished by saying that the reconciliation of the two competing groups