On the petition of the appellants, we allowed certiorari in this case to review a decision of the 9th Circuit of Appeals Court holding that Article 20 Section 2 of the Arizona state constitution did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and also that it did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, made pertinent to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The appellant in this case is an adherent to NaJepitism. Upon the death of his brother, his religion required that he marry his brother’s wife. Appellant was already married, however, NaJepitism allows for plural marriages in this case. NaJepitism also requires that its adherents …show more content…
However, the State cannot define marriage in a manner that violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Everson V. Board of Education, Cantwell V. Connecticut. In Everson, the court concluded that the Establishment Clause applied to states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Everson only dealt with establishment in particular, however, it implied that the entirety of the First Amendment applied to the States, including the Free Exercise Clause. Cantwell says this is more specific terms, noting that the “Fundamental concepts of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Knowing then, that the Free Exercise Clause must apply to the States, we must then test to see if Article 20 Section 2 of the Arizona State Constitution is in violation of the …show more content…
This court still holds that not all burdens placed on religious exercise are necessarily unconstitutional, and that if a compelling state interest exists to burden the practice, and that this burden cannot be narrowly tailored, then it is indeed constitutional to burden the religious practice of a particular individual. See e.g., Bowen V. Roy. Arguments about the inherent abusiveness of polygamous households do not seem to have any specific merit. While we hold that the State does have a compelling interest in preventing domestic violence, for example, we also recognize that there are many more abusive monogamous relationship than there are polygamous ones. The burden of the State of Arizona in this case is to find a causal link between the institution of polygamy and abuse, a burden which has not been met. We do find that there may be compelling state interest in the form of complicated inheritance
The appellant in this case is an adherent to NaJepitism. Upon the death of his brother, his religion required that he marry his brother’s wife. Appellant was already married, however, NaJepitism allows for plural marriages in this case. NaJepitism also requires that its adherents …show more content…
However, the State cannot define marriage in a manner that violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Everson V. Board of Education, Cantwell V. Connecticut. In Everson, the court concluded that the Establishment Clause applied to states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Everson only dealt with establishment in particular, however, it implied that the entirety of the First Amendment applied to the States, including the Free Exercise Clause. Cantwell says this is more specific terms, noting that the “Fundamental concepts of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Knowing then, that the Free Exercise Clause must apply to the States, we must then test to see if Article 20 Section 2 of the Arizona State Constitution is in violation of the …show more content…
This court still holds that not all burdens placed on religious exercise are necessarily unconstitutional, and that if a compelling state interest exists to burden the practice, and that this burden cannot be narrowly tailored, then it is indeed constitutional to burden the religious practice of a particular individual. See e.g., Bowen V. Roy. Arguments about the inherent abusiveness of polygamous households do not seem to have any specific merit. While we hold that the State does have a compelling interest in preventing domestic violence, for example, we also recognize that there are many more abusive monogamous relationship than there are polygamous ones. The burden of the State of Arizona in this case is to find a causal link between the institution of polygamy and abuse, a burden which has not been met. We do find that there may be compelling state interest in the form of complicated inheritance