World War II (WWII) lasted longer and killed more people than the Great War. There was not a fast victory conquered by bombers hitting the heart of the enemy. Airpower’s contribution to the allied victory did not represent the ultimate fulfillment of the predictions of interwar theorists. Even though airpower had an important role, and many lessons and doctrines emerged after this period, the visions of Douhet, Mitchell and others did not materialized as they expected. In this paper, I will discuss three of the main prophecies: the miscalculated effectiveness of the strategic bombing, the inability of airpower to win the war by itself, and the successful use of the airpower in the defense of territory.
Strategic bombing was the main theory …show more content…
Naturally, the competition for this budget was against the navy and the army. Douhet and Mitchell claimed that airpower was capable to hit the targets of the army and the navy more efficiently. Then, airpower by itself would be capable enough to win the war. Even Mitchell sunk a ship with aerial bombing, impressing American people. But his efforts to convince the policymakers created the idea of airpower as a replace of the navy and the army. This has a huge flaw about limitations inherent to the airpower. The combat airplanes in WWI could operate from small and non-prepared airfields because these machines were light and their speed was low. On the other hand, heavy bombers in WWII needed long airstrips with specific runway conditions. Under these circumstances, in the Pacific Ocean for instance, airpower could not invade territories and conquer airbases. Ground forces and the navy performed this task, allowing the bombers and fighters to operate from proper …show more content…
When the predictions were made, it seemed that there was not limit for the reach of the bombers, and that an airbase could be deployed everywhere easily. After the first campaigns, the supply chain emerged as another inherent limitation of airpower needing the support of the other services. A navy ship or submarine carry inside its internal storage the ammunition and fuel that will need during long periods. Conversely, bombers and fighters depended on external sources to recover its offensive capacities in successive sorties. In addition, the industrial plants were far away for the allies. During all the war, navy ships transported the bombs and fuel for the aircrafts through the sea lines. Furthermore, the incendiary raids of Le May over Tokyo were successful but the supply of napalm bombs conditioned its continuity. In contrast, Germany approached to the supply chain of the airpower from a different perspective. Fighting from the inland territory, the supply flew through railways easily. Not only logistics, but also all the concept of the employment of airpower developed from Germany was different of the interwar
Strategic bombing was the main theory …show more content…
Naturally, the competition for this budget was against the navy and the army. Douhet and Mitchell claimed that airpower was capable to hit the targets of the army and the navy more efficiently. Then, airpower by itself would be capable enough to win the war. Even Mitchell sunk a ship with aerial bombing, impressing American people. But his efforts to convince the policymakers created the idea of airpower as a replace of the navy and the army. This has a huge flaw about limitations inherent to the airpower. The combat airplanes in WWI could operate from small and non-prepared airfields because these machines were light and their speed was low. On the other hand, heavy bombers in WWII needed long airstrips with specific runway conditions. Under these circumstances, in the Pacific Ocean for instance, airpower could not invade territories and conquer airbases. Ground forces and the navy performed this task, allowing the bombers and fighters to operate from proper …show more content…
When the predictions were made, it seemed that there was not limit for the reach of the bombers, and that an airbase could be deployed everywhere easily. After the first campaigns, the supply chain emerged as another inherent limitation of airpower needing the support of the other services. A navy ship or submarine carry inside its internal storage the ammunition and fuel that will need during long periods. Conversely, bombers and fighters depended on external sources to recover its offensive capacities in successive sorties. In addition, the industrial plants were far away for the allies. During all the war, navy ships transported the bombs and fuel for the aircrafts through the sea lines. Furthermore, the incendiary raids of Le May over Tokyo were successful but the supply of napalm bombs conditioned its continuity. In contrast, Germany approached to the supply chain of the airpower from a different perspective. Fighting from the inland territory, the supply flew through railways easily. Not only logistics, but also all the concept of the employment of airpower developed from Germany was different of the interwar