For example, the rice market in 2007 shows the effects of governments that determine trade outcomes through export restrictions, discretionary government-to-government purchases and other trade policies (Heady 2010: 139). The analysis showed that these types of ‘‘trade shocks” severely restricted the rice supplies for the entire planet at a time when the commodity was desperately needed during initial beginning of the 2008 economic crisis (Heady 2010:140).
Noah Zerbe (2010) argument focuses strictly on the US food aid policy following the 2002 food crisis in South Africa. In 2001, United States held large quantities of surplus corn because of the international markets refusal to purchase Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) (Zerbe 2010: …show more content…
Other problems discussed were the limitations of modern agricultural techniques, land tenure problems, seasonal production bottlenecks, poverty, lack of capita and governmental financial support. Morgan and Solarz (1994) believed the productivity of the SSAs’ agricultural market would improve when the nations can restructure their agriculture and invest in both fixed and turnover capital.
Similarly, Asnell looks at the crisis through the lens of the New Variant Famine (NVF) Hypothesis. Developed by Alex de Waal and Alan Whiteside, the NVF Hypothesis states that the HIV/AIDS epidemic in southern Africa accounts for why many households are facing food shortage and explains the grim trajectory of limited recovery (Asnell 2009:188). Asnell’s analysis goes beyond household dynamics and indicates that social relationships, relations of age and gender, issues of colonialism, and the international political economy were also lead to the causes for the …show more content…
Ayensu’s (1985) thoughts were if the infrastructure were the focus for long-term productivity in agriculture, it could take hold and potentially eliminate the threat of famine in the future.
Many view the IGO interventions of the past three decades has undermined Africa’s ability to develop infrastructure to produce its own food. The food crises of the 1970s, SSA governments were forced to ask for financing for the IMF (Bryceson 2009:50). Bryceson argues that with this indebtedness, the World Bank and the IMF gained such an advantage that they were able to guide most of the economic and agricultural policy of the SSAs, a position they have held until this day.
Another approach to evaluating the effects of IGOs is by listing the corruption promulgated by the excessive amount of donor foreign aid that flows through SSA countries (Moyo 2009). He discussed how in 1978, IMF received a report warning not to provide aid to the country of Zaire (now Republic of Congo) due to wide corruption in its central
Noah Zerbe (2010) argument focuses strictly on the US food aid policy following the 2002 food crisis in South Africa. In 2001, United States held large quantities of surplus corn because of the international markets refusal to purchase Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) (Zerbe 2010: …show more content…
Other problems discussed were the limitations of modern agricultural techniques, land tenure problems, seasonal production bottlenecks, poverty, lack of capita and governmental financial support. Morgan and Solarz (1994) believed the productivity of the SSAs’ agricultural market would improve when the nations can restructure their agriculture and invest in both fixed and turnover capital.
Similarly, Asnell looks at the crisis through the lens of the New Variant Famine (NVF) Hypothesis. Developed by Alex de Waal and Alan Whiteside, the NVF Hypothesis states that the HIV/AIDS epidemic in southern Africa accounts for why many households are facing food shortage and explains the grim trajectory of limited recovery (Asnell 2009:188). Asnell’s analysis goes beyond household dynamics and indicates that social relationships, relations of age and gender, issues of colonialism, and the international political economy were also lead to the causes for the …show more content…
Ayensu’s (1985) thoughts were if the infrastructure were the focus for long-term productivity in agriculture, it could take hold and potentially eliminate the threat of famine in the future.
Many view the IGO interventions of the past three decades has undermined Africa’s ability to develop infrastructure to produce its own food. The food crises of the 1970s, SSA governments were forced to ask for financing for the IMF (Bryceson 2009:50). Bryceson argues that with this indebtedness, the World Bank and the IMF gained such an advantage that they were able to guide most of the economic and agricultural policy of the SSAs, a position they have held until this day.
Another approach to evaluating the effects of IGOs is by listing the corruption promulgated by the excessive amount of donor foreign aid that flows through SSA countries (Moyo 2009). He discussed how in 1978, IMF received a report warning not to provide aid to the country of Zaire (now Republic of Congo) due to wide corruption in its central