The Effects Of Chernobyl

1798 Words 8 Pages
The seemingly limitless power of the atom has been exploited by scientist around the world ever since the Enola Gay flew over Hiroshima on August 6th 1945 and dropped the second atomic bomb, revealing to the world this new form of energy. …show more content…
The fireproof roofing and electrical cable specified in the plan were not to be found, and so the builders had to improvise, and the supervisors to turn a blind eye to violations of the regulations. In the middle of the unit, there was a “dead zone” where nothing could be built because the plans had not arrived; yet construction continued around it in the hope that the two different sections would eventually fit together.
With such quality of craftsmanship and materials, it was a wonder that the reactor ran for three years without much incident. The functionality and safety of the reactor depended on “hope”, a rather non-concrete thing considering the magnitude of Chernobyl. The familiar policy used worldwide of reaping maximum benefit for a minimum cost was taken a step too far by the Soviets concerning Chernobyl. Most industrial facilities employ some variation of this policy, but once it crosses a certain border, the long term effect no longer provides any
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Another critical failure was the over-reliance on human performance and administrative controls rather than engineered safety features and automatic control systems. The reactor control and protection system (RCPS) controlled only a shockingly small amount of environment changes. The factors that the RCPS was designed to compensate for include: loss of fuel channel coolant water in a cold reactor, reactor-core steam collapse when fuel elements are cooled to 265oC, and possibility that one or more reactor protection control rods might stick. Many problems recognized in the early phases could not be controlled by the RCPS. Automatic controls should have been extended to almost all areas of maintaining normal operational limitations, especially with the quality of the scientist around Chernobyl. Izmailov, a veteran of Glavatomenergo, said “It was practically impossible for us to find anyone in the central directorate who knew much about reactors and nuclear physics. At the same time, however, the bookkeeping, supply, and planning department grew to an incredible size.” While it may be a bit of an exaggeration, the fact still stands that under such incompetence, it would have made logical sense to have the majority of safety and maintenance carried out through an automated

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