Dualist Theory Of Mental Space

The notion of “mental space” that Kim discusses is indeed puzzling, and the plausibility of its existence questionable. It is difficult to imagine what “location” could refer to in this space. Perhaps locations would be particular qualitative states and, on this view, perhaps minds could be distinguished from one another by appeal to the state that they possess at a given time. However, if “mental space” includes a fundamentally temporal component, as Kim believes it would have to, it follows that multiple minds, being distinct entities, could never occupy the same temporal location. But the idea that two minds could not be in the same qualitative state simultaneously is absurd! While the concept of “mental space” may be suspect, it is unclear …show more content…
This view seems to presuppose that causation must involve spatial relations and physicality. Why should this picture of causation be favoured? It is an explicit component of the dualist theory that it would be incoherent to think of consciousness and thought, which both lack extension and a spatial location, as existing within material substance which, by definition, is extended in space (43). It seems just as incoherent to think of minds in physical space! Mental causation, the dualist would hold, ought to involve mental terms, such as thought, consciousness, and intentionality. Kim 's gun example appears to provide a satisfactory account of causation between two physical objects because it utilizes physical terms and mentions extension and spatial relations, both of which are essential to material bodies. Why should there not be a parallel in discussing mental causation? There is no obvious reason why the dualist could not hold that what pairs a mind to a specific body (or a separate mind) is that content of that mind 's mental state, and that causation concerns what that mental state is …show more content…
When a mind causes an effect on a body in the physical world, or on another mind in the mental realm, time is important insofar as the mind doing the causing must have the appropriate mental state before the effect manifests. Kim neglects to identify time as a relevant component in the more straightforward case of physical causation as well. In his gun example, the explanation of why gun A is connected to the death of person X includes the fact that A was fired first and X was killed secondly. After all, that A had the correct relation to X in terms of distance and orientation is not informative if X died before A was fired! Temporal precedence plays an equally significant part in explaining physical causation as it does mental causation, and therefore should not be deemed a unique factor for the